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Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy
Sofia Ranchordás*
ABSTRACT
Sharing economy practices have become increasingly
popular in recent years. From swapping systems to network
transportation to private kitchens, sharing with strangers
appears to be the new urban trend. Although Uber, Airbnb, and
other online platforms have democratized access to a number of
services and facilities, concerns have been raised as to public
safety, health, and limited liability of these sharing economy
practices. In addition, these innovative activities have been
contested by professionals offering similar services who claim
that the sharing economy is opening the door to unfair
competition. Regulators are at a crossroads: on the one hand,
innovation in the sharing economy should not be stifled by
excessive and outdated regulation; on the other hand, there is a
real need to protect the users of these services from fraud,
liability, and unskilled service providers. This dilemma is far
more complex than it seems, since regulators are confronted here
with an array of challenging questions. First, can these sharing
economy practices be qualified as “innovations” worth protecting
and encouraging? Second, should the regulation of these
practices serve the same goals as the existing rules for
equivalent commercial services? Third, how can regulation keep
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up with the evolving nature of these innovative practices? All of
these questions come down to one simple problem: too little is
known about the socially effective ways of consistently
regulating and promoting innovation. The solution to these
problems requires analyzing two fields of study, both of which
seem to be at an embryonic stage in legal literature: the study of
sharing economy practices and the relationship between
innovation and law in this area. This Article analyzes the
challenges of regulating the sharing economy from an
“innovation law perspective,” by arguing that these innovations
should not be stifled by regulation, but should also not be left
unregulated. This Article closes by suggesting that innovation
in the sharing economy requires fewer, but broader rules that do
not stifle innovation, but also impose a minimum of legal
requirements that take into account the specificities of
innovative sharing economy practices, and that are open for
future developments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. “UBERING” IND.C.
Pick-up address selected, four minutes waiting time, car
selected, driver on her way. During a hot summer in
Washington D.C., I decided to introduce the concept of the
“sharing economy” in my life.1 Not that hailing a cab is difficult
around here, but being able to go out without cash, save some
money, and track who is picking you up might make any ride in
this city more pleasant. Uber, and other forms of the sharing
economy, are some of the innovations that are making markets
more competitive while improving access to a number of
facilities and services.2 Most of us welcome these innovations.
Going on vacation, hiring a handy amateur to assemble our
new furniture, renting a car for a short ride, or swapping goods
has never been so convenient and inexpensive. You are now
1. See generally Steve Henn, What’s Mine Is Yours (For a Price) in the
Sharing Economy, NPR (Nov. 13, 2013, 3:16 AM), http://www.npr.org
/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/11/13/244860511/whats-mine-is-yours-for-a-price
-in-the-sharing-economy; Raj Kapoor, Lessons From the Sharing Economy,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/30/critical
-lessons-from-the-sharing-economy/ (“Companies everywhere are jumping on
the sharing economy trend.”); The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-ev
erything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.
2. See Russell Belk, You Are What You Can Access: Sharing and
Collaborative Consumption Online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595 (2014) (discussing
the rise of the sharing economy as a result of increased access to resources,
facilitated by the Internet).
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what you can access, and not what you have.3 In this new
model, access is “the new form of ownership.”4
One decade ago, sharing economy practices would have
been unthinkable, not only because we were living in more
prosperous times, but also because we would not have
conceived of engaging in such transactions with strangers, not
to mention unlicensed strangers that play taxi drivers in their
spare time.5 Now we do, but there appear to be no rules or
limits in this game. Can and should we set them? Should
everyone play by the same rules? And is this a new game like
no other we have seen before?
B. THE ADVENTURES ANDMISADVENTURES OF THE SHARING
ECONOMY
In the last couple of years, the popularity and business of
the sharing economy has increased tremendously.6 Uber,
Airbnb, Lyft, and other forms of the sharing economy are
innovative forms of sharing underused facilities.7 The sharing
economy presupposes two elements: the existence of physical
“shareable goods that systematically have excess capacity,” and
a sharing attitude or motivation.8 The idea behind the sharing
economy is simple: consumers will share goods when
transaction costs related to the coordination of economic
3. Id. at 1595 (“The old wisdom that we are what we own, may need
modifying to consider forms of possession and uses that do not involve
ownership.”).
4. Id.; see also The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1 (“As
proponents of the sharing economy like to put it, access trumps ownership.”).
5. See Henn, supra note 1 (noting that the sharing economy was a result
of the financial crisis).
6. See id. (“The sharing, or peer-to-peer, economy is exploding.”); The
Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1.
7. See Henn, supra note 1; The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note
1; see also All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013)
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborative
-consumption-technology-makes-it-easier-people-rent-items (“Technology
makes it easier for people to rent items to each other. But as it grows, the
‘sharing economy’ is hitting roadblocks.”). For other examples of the sharing
economy, see infra notes 207, 299 and accompanying text.
8. See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J.
273, 276, 288 (2004).
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activities within specific communities are low.9 Sharing
practices have become a widespread phenomenon with the
development of information and communication social
technology that easily connects strangers, supports peer-to-
peer collaboration, increases incentives to cooperate, acquires
information about the past and present, and predicts future
behavior of participants involved in sharing practices.10 In
addition, the price of sharing is significantly lower than the
price of owning.11
Shareable goods and sharing systems have been welcomed
by a significant number of users that now have access to a
greater number of services for a lower price, have met other
members of their communities, and have found an extra source
of income.12 These are exactly the types of innovation needed in
a time of economic crisis and enhanced individualism.13 The
increase in sharing practices and collaborative consumption is
a reaction against the traditional Western consumer culture
and fits within a culture of sustainability and a recent “wave of
social innovation.”14 However, in a number of European and
American cities, ride-sharing practices have not always been
well accepted, evidenced by organized protests and strikes by
licensed taxi companies.15 These companies have filed
9. See id. at 277–78.
10. See Belk, supra note 2; The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1
(“[T]echnology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets cheaper
and easier than ever . . . .”); see also Benkler, supra note 8, at 333, 336; Juho
Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative
Consumption 1 (May 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271971.
11. See Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better
than Mine? A Framework for Understanding and Altering Participation in
Commercial Sharing Systems, 76 J. MARKETING 109, 111 (2012).
12. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1.
13. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 7 (“It is surely no
coincidence that many peer-to-peer rental firms were founded between 2008
and 2010, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.”); see, e.g., Henn,
supra note 1 (“In 2009, as the economy collapsed and [Airbnb] was getting off
the ground, this became a godsend for some.”).
14. Pia A. Albinsson & B. Yasanthi Perera, Alternative Marketplaces in
the 21st Century: Building Community Through Sharing Events, 11 J.
CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 303, 305 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Mark Tran, Taxi Drivers in European Capitals Strike over
Uber—As It Happened, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014, 11:35 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/11/taxi-drivers-strike-uber-lond
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complaints against Uber Technologies, which has led to the
prohibition of Uber in several cities, including Berlin and
Brussels, since April 2014.16 This culminated in a nationwide
prohibition by the Frankfurt District Court.17 Berlin’s District
Court, for example, qualified Uber as a rental car service that
was violating German passenger transport laws.18 According to
these laws, rental cars are required to return to their place of
business after completing an assignment.19 This is not the case
for Uber drivers that remain circulating in the city center after
dropping off their customers.20 The Frankfurt District Court
went further than previous cases on the topic and highlighted
that Uber failed to have the necessary licenses and insurance
and posed unfair competition to the local taxi industry.21
In London, the regulation of this transportation service has
also been highly contested and it seems to be pushing the
boundaries of legal concepts and interpretation.22 For example,
we have witnessed recent debates on whether the Uber
smartphone application could be qualified as a “taximeter”
within the meaning of the legislation.23 Taxi drivers claimed
that only licensed black car drivers could use “taximeter”
on-live-updates (discussing organized strikes by taxi drivers in London, Paris,
Madrid, and Berlin to protest against privately-hired cars offered by Uber in
June 2014).
16. See, e.g., Jeevan Vasagar, Uber Taxi Service Suffers Setback in Berlin,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1591faf2
-c638-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz387TxWRMa.
17. See Mark Scott & Melissa Eddy, Uber Service Banned Across
Germany by Frankfurt Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014, 5:45 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/uber-banned-across-germany-by-fran
kfurt-court/?_php=true&_type=blogs, for a recent press release on the decision
of the Frankfurt District Court stating, “[a] German court has slapped an
injunction on the popular car pick-up service Uber, saying it lacks the needed
legal permits.”
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Vasagar, supra note 16.
21. See Scott & Eddy, supra note 17.
22. See Neil Brown, Uber: TfL and the Taxonomy of Taximeters, SCL—
THE IT LAW COMMUNITY (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.scl.org/site.aspx
?i=ed38518.
23. See id. (examining the “recent controversy over the taxi app ‘Uber,’
and question[ing] whether TfL’s decision in favour of Uber is a beneficial step
for innovation”).
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technology.24 London’s transit regulator, Transport for London
(TfL), recently decided that this was not the case, removing an
obstacle to Uber’s activity in London.25 However, the clash
between the interests of licensed taxi drivers and the need to
encourage innovations such as this one is far from being
solved.26
In addition, taxi drivers are not the only licensed service
providers furrowing their brows at the sharing economy. In
New York City, Airbnb27 has also faced legal problems, and
numerous fines have been applied to Airbnb hosts for not
complying with local regulations.28 According to New York
regulations, Airbnb rooms and apartments can be qualified as
illegal hotels.29 However, there appear to be alternatives to this
24. See id.
25. See TfL to Invite High Court to Rule on Taximeters, TRANSPORT FOR
LONDON (May 29, 2014), http://www.tfl.gov.uk/info-for/media/press-releases
/2014/may/tfl-to-invite-high-court-to-rule-on-taximeters (“TfL set out its
provisional view that smart phones used by private hire drivers . . . do not
constitute the equipping of a vehicle with a ‘taximeter.’”).
26. See Katie Collins, Uber Welcomes TfL’s Taximeter High Court
Referral, WIRED.CO.UK (May 30, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news
/archive/2014-05/30/uber-tfl-high-court (“The Licensed Taxi Driver’s
Association (LTDA) is adamant that Uber is breaching the private hire
act and drivers of London’s black cabs are due to protest against Uber . . . .”).
27. Airbnb is an online platform that connects private hosts renting their
houses for a short period with travelers. All payments are made through this
online platform and Airbnb users can provide feedback on their hosts and
“clients.” See How Do I Travel on Airbnb?, AIRBNB (last visited Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/271 (explaining rules and guidelines for
hosting apartments and booking reservations on Airbnb.com).
28. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, A $2,400 Fine for an Airbnb Host, N.Y. TIMES
(May 21, 2013, 2:22 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/a-2400
-fine-for-an-airbnb-host/ (“Nigel Warren faced steep fines for violations from
renting his apartment on Airbnb.”); Room for All, for Now, ECONOMIST (Apr.
26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21601259-there-are-signs
-sharing-site-starting-threaten-budget-hotels-room-all.
29. See, e.g., ERIC. T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., AIRBNB IN
THE CITY 14 (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb
%20report.pdf (“Numerous Units Booked as Private Short-Term Rentals May
Have Operated as Illegal Hostels.”); see also Elizabeth A. Harris, Short-Term
Rentals via the Web: Lucrative but Often Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at
A22 (“In most residential apartment buildings, renting out your space for less
than 30 days is illegal, unless you are present . . . .”); Catherine Yang, Illegal
Hotel Operator Made Nearly $7 Million Using Airbnb, EPOCH TIMES (Oct. 16,
2014), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1024373-illegal-hotel-operator-made
-nearly-7-million-using-airbnb/ (discussing a report released by Attorney
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all-or-nothing approach. In February 2014, the municipality of
Amsterdam decided to authorize the private rental of houses to
tourists in an attempt to reduce the regulatory uncertainty,
and to address the growing problem of professionals who rent
multiple houses through Airbnb.30
Sharing economy practices challenge regulations on a daily
basis, evidencing the tension between the need to encourage
innovation and the need to protect customers from fraud,
liability, and practices that might endanger public health or
safety.31 In the world of the sharing economy, traditional legal
boundaries are easily blurred, resulting in legal gray areas and
regulatory uncertainty.32 In addition, these tensions cannot
always be reduced to a combat between David—innovative but
small start-ups that connect individuals—and Goliath—
municipalities and agencies concerned about compliance with
safety regulation, or large hotel chains and taxi corporations
that do not wish to lose their clients.33 Some electronic
platforms, such as Uber and Airbnb, are far from being run
from basements.34 Still, this does not mean that their
innovative potential should not be cherished. The real clash
here is between the interest to stimulate innovation and the
need to protect the public from its potential harms.35
General Eric Schneiderman and stating that, “the vast majority of Airbnb
listings are illegal, and ‘multi-million dollar businesses’ of illegal hotels are
being run out of the most ‘gentrified neighborhoods’ of New York City”).
30. See Jarl van der Ploeg, Amsterdam Akkoord Met Huis Verhuren aan
Toeristen, VOLKSKRANT (Feb. 15, 2014, 8:28 AM), http://www.volkskrant.nl
/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3597693/2014/02/15/Amsterdam-akkoord
-met-huis-verhuren-aan-toeristen.dhtml (Ger.) (discussing Amsterdam’s
decision to allow temporary leasing of private space to tourists; the
municipality of Amsterdam allows property owners to rent their houses to a
maximum number of four tourists for the maximum of three months).
31. See Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New:
Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 BOSTON BAR J. 34 (2014) (discussing the
delicate balance of safety with economic development in the sharing economy).
32. Id. at 34–37 (explaining how “the start-ups’ rapid emergence defy long
regulatory timelines” and discussing where the regulatory line should be
drawn moving forward).
33. Id. at 34.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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While we all praise innovation and the existence of sharing
economy practices,36 we should first ask whether these sharing
economy practices can be qualified as innovations. Second, we
should analyze how regulation should approach innovation
given its multiple complexities. Third, it is important to
question whether the regulations of their equivalent
commercial services are applicable to them or whether
regulators should “lower their standards”—and for how long—
taking into account the goals and nature of these practices, its
innovative character, and evolving nature. Fourth, we should
examine whether these unlicensed services open the door to
risks that could be controlled by enacting specific regulations or
applying existing ones. In this context, regulators are at a
crossroads with multiple controversies. They do not have
sufficient information about these innovations or their risks,
and might wonder whether the application of existing rules to
these new forms of taxis or hotels might stifle innovation, be
unreasonable, and even constitute an unwarranted
interpretation of statutes.37 Furthermore, the enactment of new
regulations may leave out new sharing economy practices that
might emerge in the meantime.38
Innovation is a moving and evolving target.39 Regulators
can try to shape and guide the means to hit this target,
ensuring that it follows certain routes.40 However, these routes
should be in line with the movement of innovation and should
not involve shooting down new technologies and services before
they finally hit this moving target.41
36. Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
2257, 2260 (2010) (“Everybody appears to worship innovation and all parties
raise innovation arguments to justify their positions.”).
37. See Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung, Regulating Technologies:
Tools, Targets and Thematics, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 3–22 (Roger
Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008), for an overview of the general
problems encountered by regulators when faced with the need to regulate new
technologies and innovation.
38. See id.
39. Cf. id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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C. THE ADVENTURE OF REGULATING INNOVATION
Innovation is a hot topic these days.42 It is a particularly
hot topic during a time of economic crisis, when we are
reminded that governments must prioritize investments in
research and development (R&D) and redefine their innovation
policies so as to enhance productivity and foster economic
growth.43 Contrary to our common perception of innovation,
this phenomenon also occurs outside large research centers,
laboratories, and the garages and basements of courageous
inventors. Innovation is more than the latest technology; it is a
phenomenon that can result in the improvement of living
conditions of people and strengthening of communities.
Innovation can be technological and social, and the former
might assist the latter to empower groups in ways we once
thought unimaginable.
In a period where innovation has been given the leading
role, regulators face the additional responsibility of regulating
innovative products and services without stifling innovation.44
While “[m]uch has been written about invention and
innovation . . . [there are not many] precise clues as to what
needs to be supported, promoted or measured . . . [leading] to
policy formulations that are seriously flawed or, at best,
ineffective.”45 Innovation is a difficult phenomenon to
understand, promote, and regulate within and beyond the
sharing economy.46 The regulation of innovation in the sharing
economy is particularly complex because it is unclear whether
42. See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE
SHOULD LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 27–46 (Yale Univ. Press 2013)
(analyzing and challenging conventional business wisdom that stems
innovation).
43. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33526,
COOPERATIVE R&D: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE INDUSTRIAL
COMPETITIVENESS 1–4 (2008) (“The government has supported various efforts
to promote cooperative research and development activities among industry,
universities, and the federal R&D establishment designed to increase the
competitiveness of American industry and to encourage the generation of new
products, processes, and services.”).
44. See id.
45. Luis Suarez-Villa, Innovative Capacity, Infrastructure and Regional
Policy, in INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 258 (David F. Batten & Charlie Karlsson eds., 1996).
46. See id.
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these practices fit within existing legal frameworks that apply
to equivalent commercial practices and should play by the
same rules, whether these practices should remain to a great
extent unregulated, or whether these practices should benefit
from less demanding regulations. This hesitation has opened
the door to uncertainty and lack of transparency.
A great number of sharing practices do not require
regulation, since they belong to the personal sphere, similar to
what occurs during swaps or rides between friends or charity.47
Numerous sharing practices are closer to forms of social
innovation motivated mainly by the spirit of giving,48 as
opposed to others, such as Uber, which are mainly profit-
driven.49 Sharing, however, does not always mean caring, as
these platforms open the backdoor to fraudulent behavior, and
risk becoming parallel, unsafe, and underinsured practices.50 A
laissez-faire approach does not suffice in this scenario and, as
mentioned above, has resulted in the strict prohibition of these
sharing economy practices, since different courts have not been
convinced by Uber’s arguments that it should not be subject to
the same rules as taxi drivers.51
D. THE APPROACH
This Article approaches the regulation of sharing economy
practices from an “innovation law perspective.” The spotlight
here is on the challenges that characterize innovation and the
balance between the need to encourage innovation on the one
hand and, on the other, limit the uncertainty and risks
attached to the sharing economy. By analyzing the
characteristics of sharing economy practices, this Article
discusses potential approaches to the regulation of these
47. JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING
PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIES 563 (2012).
48. For example, collaborative practices among neighbors.
49. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Why Uber Might Well Be Worth $18 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, at B1 (“[T]he limousine and taxi-fetching app
company[] was valued on Friday at $18.2 billion . . . .”).
50. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, The Question of Coverage for Ride Service
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, at B1 (discussing Uber’s insurance policies
and legislation introduced after an Uber driver’s fatal car accident).
51. See Vasagar, supra note 16; supra Part I.B.
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phenomena that meet the interests of innovators in this field,
while offering a minimum of guarantees to users.
This Article aims to answer the following central question:
how can we find the balance between encouraging innovation
in sharing economy practices while regulating it to protect
customers from a number of risks that might arise from
unlicensed practices? This Article starts at an abstract level by
addressing the first challenge: that encouraging and regulating
innovation implies knowing what “innovation” is, what its
characteristics are, and in the particular case of the sharing
economy, being able to define what exactly is innovative about
these sharing economy practices. Part II focuses on the
phenomenon of innovation, distinguishes between different
types of innovation, and addresses the uncertainties and
complexities that characterize innovation.52 These difficulties
are equally present in the case of the sharing economy. Based
on this preliminary analysis of the innovation process, Part III
addresses the regulation of innovation, arguing that regulators
should focus on the need to tackle its newness, uncertainty, and
inherent risks. Part IV is specifically devoted to sharing
economy practices. Part IV describes the most common forms of
collaboration and introduces its regulatory challenges. Part V
applies the theoretical aspects discussed in previous Parts, and
discusses both existing and proposed regulatory solutions for
the regulation of the sharing economy. This last Part proposes
overarching solutions to ensure that rules can keep up with
innovation, or at least show openness to future improvements
and innovative practices. More than offering a set of solutions
for the regulation of innovation in the sharing economy, this
Article aims to ask the right questions regarding what
regulators and judges should be considering when confronted
with innovative products and services, including the need to
decide on the application of existing regulations to sharing
economy practices, and the consequent authorization or
prohibition of novel sharing economy practices.
52. Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, In Search of Useful Theory of
Innovation, 6 RES. POL’Y 37, 47–48 (1977) (“Explicit recognition of uncertainty
is important in thinking about policy.”).
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II. INNOVATION
The economic and social benefits of innovation for the
growth and development of any developed nation are now
almost indisputable.53 In the past few decades, different social
and technological innovations have contributed substantially to
the improvement of living standards, and have enhanced the
diversity, quality, and safety of products on the market.54 Not
surprisingly, the stimulation of innovation has been included in
the priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy55 and is conceived as
a step towards a “more competitive, sustainable and inclusive
economy.”56 Innovation has been placed at the center of U.S.
policies57 and Europe 2020 priorities,58 and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
pleaded on numerous occasions for the development of renewed
visions and “strategic road map[s] to encourage innovation.”59
This leading role for innovation results from the idea that
creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation should put us on
53. See SCHACHT, supra note 43, at 1–2.
54. See Robert Cooter et al., The Importance of Law in Promoting
Innovation and Growth, in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 1–2 (2011) (discussing
the growth in developing economies, advancing living standards, and other
types of progress worldwide).
55. See EUR. COMM’N, EUROPE 2020: A EUROPEAN STRATEGY FOR SMART,
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 3 (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%200
07%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf (“Europe 2020 puts
forward three mutually reinforcing priorities . . . [including] developing an
economy based on knowledge and innovation.”).
56. EUR. COMM’N, INNOVATION UNION COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 1
(2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf
/competitiveness-report/2011/iuc2011-full-report.pdf.
57. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the
Economy (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-the-Economy-in-Wakarusa-Indiana/
(“[I]nnovation is more important than ever.”).
58. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 55, at 3 (highlighting Europe 2020’s
“three mutually reinforcing priorities,” which include “[s]mart growth:
developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation,” “[s]ustainable
growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive
economy,” and “[i]nclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy
delivering social and territorial cohesion”).
59. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REGIONS AND INNOVATION
POLICY 20 (2011), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-
regional -development/regions-and-innovation-policy_9789264097803-en.
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the path of economic growth.60 While it is clear that legal
institutions should play a role in shaping an environment
conducive to innovation, we are still very far from mastering
the paths of innovation. As Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright
have pointed out, “the ratio of what is known to what is
unknown with respect to the relationship between innovation,
competition, and regulatory policy is staggeringly low.”61 We
often do not know how innovation emerges, what its
complexities are, how to deal with its inherent uncertainty, and
how to design a set of legal institutions and instruments that
encourage it. The first step should be the defining innovation.
A. INNOVATION: MORE THAN AWORD
Innovation is inherent to the human being.62 Throughout
the centuries, the pursuit of innovation has awakened our
curiosity and eagerness to learn, driving the need to constantly
challenge us and improve the state-of-the-art.63 Innovation is a
broad concept that can be defined differently depending on the
context and field in question.64 Innovation rarely emerges due
to fortuitous discoveries.65 Instead, it is often the result of
persistent actors that dare to “think outside the box,” try to
develop new solutions for existing problems, resist opposition to
new ideas, and break new ground with their inventions.66
Innovation emerges, evolves, and is rapidly dissolved in banal
60. See SCHACHT, supra note 43, at 1 (“[T]echnological advancement is
critical in that it contributes to economic growth.”).
61. COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
REGULATING INNOVATION 1 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds.,
2011).
62. See Jan Fagerberg, Innovation: A Guide to the Literature, in THE
OXFORDHANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 1, 1 (Jan Fagerberg et al., eds., 2007).
63. See id. at 4–5.
64. See id. at 4 (“It is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were
a well-defined, homogenous thing . . . .”).
65. BARBARA THOMAβ, Stimulierung Innovativer Angebote im Rundfunk,
in INNOVATION, RECHT UND ÖFFENTLICHE KOMMUNIKATION 150, 153 (Martin
Eifert & Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem eds., 2011) (Ger.) (analyzing the regulation
of the offer of innovative media products and the challenges to traditional
regulation).
66. Id.
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daily objects.67 This evolving nature of innovation means that
policymakers and regulators are forced to chase a chameleon.68
In the legal context, innovation is a concept frequently
associated with “something significantly new.”69 Nonetheless,
the former cannot be qualified as a legal concept.70 Rather, it is
particularly in business and public policy literature that the
concept of innovation has been explored and defined. Richard
R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, for example, define innovation
as a “wide range of variegated processes by which man’s
technologies evolve over time.”71 More simplistic definitions
refer to innovation as “the application of new knowledge to
industry . . . [including] new products, new processes, and
social and organisational change.”72 In sum, the innovation
process is the “process of putting ideas into useful form and
bringing them to market . . . .”73
For the purposes of this Article, innovation is defined as
“the ability to take new ideas and translate them into
commercial [or effective social] outcomes by using new
processes, products, or services . . . .”74 Innovation is more than
an idea or a novelty; it must be the first successful
concretization of an idea in the marketplace or in society.75
Contrary to an invention, innovation is not the “first occurrence
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Stefan Müller, Innovationsrecht-Konturen Einer Rechtsmaterie, 2
INNOVATIONS UND TECHNIKRECHT 58, 60 (2013) (Ger.) (developing the idea of
“innovation law” as an interdisciplinary field of study that combines law and
multilevel governance, and arguing that it should be placed at the forefront of
other policies).
70. Id.
71. Nelson & Winter, supra note 52, at 37.
72. Lucy Firth & David Mellor, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation, 8
EUR. J.L. & ECON. 199, 199 (1999).
73. EUGENE FITZGERALD ET AL., INSIDE REAL INNOVATION: HOW THE
RIGHT APPROACH CAN MOVE IDEAS FROM R&D TO MARKET AND GET THE
ECONOMYMOVING 2 (2011).
74. Richard Bendis & Ethan Byler, Creating a National Innovation
Framework, SCI. PROGRESS, Apr. 2009, at 1, 7, available at
http://www.scienceprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/bendis_innovation
.pdf; see also Nelson & Winter, supra note 52, at 48 (“[A] theory of innovation
must incorporate explicitly the stochastic evolutionary nature of innovation,
and must have considerable room for organizational complexity and
diversity.”).
75. See Fagerberg, supra note 62, at 4.
428 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:1
of an idea for a new product or process,” but rather, the first
attempt to “carry[] them out in practice.”76
This definition of innovation includes not only the
technological aspects of innovation, but also social innovation,
with the latter referring to “the design and implementation of
creative ways of meeting social needs.”77 Innovation does not
need to be profit-oriented, as long as it translates the first
successful realization of an idea that improves, from a
technological, social, or economic perspective, the status quo.78
Innovation refers not only to emerging technologies but also to
socially innovative programs and services that aim to reduce
poverty and discrimination, and that also aim to integrate
minorities—the so-called “social innovation.”79 This broad
concept of innovation is relevant in the context of collaborative
practices that are designed to empower communities and
incentivize interactions between strangers.80 For example, one
could question the social contact promoted by sharing
transportation practices such as Uber or Lyft, where strangers
are expected to do more than just sit next to each other and
share a ride.81 Engaging in casual conversation in the context
of car sharing systems might not fit our traditional perception
of social innovation that is more often connected with charity.82
However, breaking the circle of individualism by sharing and
caring does not necessarily stretch the concept of social
innovation too far.
Innovation—particularly in the case of the sharing
economy—is a complex concept composed of multiple
dimensions that requires a thorough analysis. First, innovation
76. See id. at 3 (emphasis added).
77. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, President Barroso Discusses How to
Boost “Social Innovation” 1 (Jan. 20, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-81_en.htm.
78. See id.
79. See id. (“Examples of social innovation . . . [include] an initiative
which creates local partnerships to reintegrate socially excluded, homeless or
those released from prisons, or leaving orphanage . . . .”).
80. See Megan Rose Dickey, Lyft Rides Are So Social that a Driver Invited
a Passenger Over for Thanksgiving Dinner, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 15, 2014, 10:33
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/qa-with-lyft-ceo-john-zimmer-2014-3.
81. See id. (“Lyft drivers and passengers are already forming deep
connections.”).
82. See id.
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should have a welfare dimension, consisting of positive change
for society in general, or for groups of individuals. Second,
innovation should be regarded as a relative concept, which
means that “new” does not always amount to absolutely
inventive, but “new” in a determined setting, time, and place.
Last, innovation can be translated either in social or
technological improvements. The following subsection
elaborates on the different elements of the concept of
innovation and applies them to the context of the sharing
economy.
B. THE ELEMENTS OF “INNOVATION” IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
SHARING ECONOMY
1. A Change for the Better
Innovation is often understood as a change for the better.
However, such welfare considerations should take place at the
time of the occurrence of the innovation—decades later,
everything could have been done better. In addition, innovation
is a relative concept, depending on the social and economic
circumstances of a country, state, or community.83 Moreover,
innovation is context- and sector-specific; it depends on the
socioeconomic conditions it is embedded in. Therefore, context
must be considered or else innovation is “unlikely to meet the
needs of most people, especially in countries [or regions] where
innovation and poverty reside side by side.”84 A socially
innovative idea that provides more access to knowledge and
information to an impoverished community might not be
absolutely new in other places and contexts, but its application
in that community may be highly innovative and worth
rewarding.85 The innovative ideas included in the concept of
innovation refer to new products, services, and public policies
that either have a commercial goal or simply an altruistic aim
to solve social problems.86
83. See Smita Srinivas & Judith Schutz, Developing Countries and
Innovation: Searching for a New Analytical Approach, 30 TECH. SOC’Y 129,
129 (2008).
84. Id.
85. See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
86. See Srinivas & Schutz, supra note 83.
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2. Innovation as a Relative Concept
An innovation is something new to a certain region, state,
or country; it is thus a relative concept that should be
evaluated in a particular region, time, and sector.87 For
example, a program or policy will qualify as an innovation
when it “is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the
program may be or how many other states have adopted it.”88
The regulation of this innovation might still pose important
challenges to a jurisdiction even if it has been implemented and
regulated elsewhere.89 In this Article, the newness of the
innovation in question is not assessed in global terms, but is
related to the experience and knowledge of the jurisdiction in
question: have sharing economy practices been used in city X or
Y, or are they entirely new? The fact that Uber has been used
for some years in San Francisco does not mean it cannot be
qualified as an innovation in a European city.90
Innovation is often distinguished from invention, defined
as the conception of a new idea, a discovery, or a unique
finding.91 In the case of the sharing economy, this degree of
newness (understood as invention) is not required for the
adopted concept of innovation, since common examples of
collaborative consumption have existed for centuries.92
However, many of these examples have gained a new
dimension with the emergence of online platforms and
smartphone applications.93 To illustrate, before the time of
87. See Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American
States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880, 881 (1969).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 881–82 (discussing the diffusion of innovations and offering
a methodology for assessing why “some states adopt innovations more readily
than others”).
90. See generally Vasagar, supra note 16 (providing background
information on the Uber taxi service and its venture into Germany).
91. See, e.g., LUKE A. STEWART, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE
IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A CROSS-
INDUSTRY LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2010) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Harper & Brothers 1942)),
available at http://www.itif.org/files/2011-impact-regulation-innovation.pdf
(distinguishing innovation as the “commercially successful application of an
idea, from invention, the initial development of an idea”).
92. See generally ORSI, supra note 47, at 526–27 (describing hotels,
hostels, boarding houses, and temporary stays).
93. See id.
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hotels or hostels, pilgrims and other travelers would request to
stay with strangers that they would encounter.94 These
strangers would provide food and shelter and often receive
compensation from their guests.95 We should nonetheless see
Airbnb and other platforms of hosting guests as innovations,
since they are new in their current forms.
The aspect of newness of an innovation is thus a relative
concept.96 Something is new from a current perspective, even if
it had existed previously—but had been abandoned—or had
existed elsewhere with similar characteristics.97 Newness is
determined here as a subjective value conditioned by time and
space. From a temporal perspective, the faster and more
widespread the effects of an innovation might be, the sooner it
will lose its “new” character.98 From a spatial perspective,
although diffusion of an innovation might determine its
successful commercialization, it will also erode its “new”
character.99 Temporary or local oblivion might allow an old
practice to reemerge and contribute in an innovative fashion to
the improvement of current living conditions.100
There are two basic interpretations of newness: (1) the
Schumpeterian idea of innovation (“creative destruction”),
implying the development of a product which creates a
discontinuity in relation to the existing ones;101 and (2) the
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. For example, an innovation may be new in one region and not in
another. SeeWalker, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
97. See NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., MICROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT ch. 10
(2008), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/education_materials
/modules/Consumption_and_the_Consumer_Society.pdf.
98. See Walker, supra note 87, at 897–98 (arguing that states are more
likely to adopt innovation already adopted by other states because of the
perception that the non-adopting state is “relatively deprived”).
99. Marian Adolf, Die Kultur der Innovation: Eine Herausforderung des
Innovationsbegriffes als Form gesellschaftlichen Wissens, in
HERAUSFORDERUNG INNOVATION: EINE INTERDISZIPLINÄRE DEBATTE 25, 30
(Reto M. Hilty et al. eds., Springer 2012) (Ger.) (explaining the concept of
innovation as a form of social knowledge or lack of it).
100. For example, the “Airbnb” uses modern technology to revitalize the
practice of peer-to-peer room renting. Cf. Yang, supra note 29 (describing how
the Airbnb “home-sharing app” has facilitated a market of short-term room
renting).
101. SCHUMPETER, supra note 91 (describing “Creative Destruction” as an
essential fact of capitalism).
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notion of incremental improvement in a product’s design, such
as changes in organization or processes that increase efficiency
or ensure environmental sustainability.102 The Schumpeterian
concept of innovation refers to changes in paradigms, or
breakthrough innovations that transform existing technology
and our society by introducing revolutionary new products.103
In contrast, incremental innovation builds on existing
knowledge and constitutes an extension or improvement of
present technologies or practices.104 Most innovations, even if
they break with existing paradigms, are built on existing
knowledge and derive from a “step-by-step co-evolutionary
process of change.”105
The concept of innovation should not be mistaken with the
concept of “mere change.”106 Innovation is a type of change, one
that brings about a new approach to technology or a new
method (e.g., reducing poverty).107 Contrary to some
breakthrough changes that can be perceived as negative,
innovation—particularly in the field of the sharing economy
and other fields with social relevance—should stand for
“improvement.”108 Mere changes can be a reaction to a social
problem (e.g., arresting homeless people to reduce the visibility
of poverty), whereas innovative solutions are proactive
responses to problems (e.g., developing social structures and
102. Milou Beerepoot & Niels Beerepoot, Government Regulation as an
Impetus for Innovation: Evidence from Energy Performance Regulation in the
Dutch Residential Building Sector, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 4812, 4813 (2007).
103. See Ronald Mascelli, From Experience: Harnessing Tacit Knowledge to
Achieve Breakthrough Innovation, 17 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 179, 179–
81 (2000) (discussing how creative breakthroughs provide far more
commercial value than incremental improvements).
104. See Beerepoot & Beerepoot, supra note 102, at 4813 (“[N]ew ideas that
actually get to market are usually incremental improvements on existing
technology.”).
105. Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, The Importance of Regulation-
Induced Innovation for Sustainable Development, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 270, 273
(2011).
106. Cf. Carol Slappendel, Perspectives on Innovation in Organizations, 17
ORG. STUD. 107, 107 (1996) (discussing how “newness or novelty” is often a
key characteristic of innovation and that change alone is not sufficient for
something to be perceived as innovative).
107. Cf. id. (explaining that “all innovations imply change”).
108. See Peter Schramade, Innovatie en verandering, 135 HOLLAND MGMT.
REV. 3, 3 (2011) (arguing that change is associated with negative emotions
and innovation is associated with positive emotions).
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guaranteeing shelter, healthcare, and reintegration programs
for the homeless).109
3. Technological and Social Improvements
This Article does not reduce innovation to the mere
“development and deployment of technological
improvements,”110 but instead follows the trend to pay
attention to the encouragement of innovation in social fields.111
Innovations in the sharing economy merge concepts of both
technological and social innovations.112 Often, the idea of
sharing was already there, but the creation of an online
platform or a smartphone application that connects users in a
simple way constitutes the innovative element of the
practice.113 These technological elements of an innovation are
usually palpable technical improvements that can be easily
identified.114 Socially innovative aspects are however more
109. Id. (discussing how change is reactive and innovation is proactive).
110. Contra STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & ARTI K. RAI, STRUCTURING U.S.
INNOVATION POLICY: CREATING A WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF INNOVATION
POLICY 2 (2009), available at http://www.itif.org/files/WhiteHouse
_Innovation.pdf (using a restrictive definition of innovation that involves only
the “development and deployment of technological improvements”).
111. See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY, THIS IS
EUROPEAN SOCIAL INNOVATION 9, 14–27 (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/flipbook/social_innovation/ (describing ten
recent social innovation projects in Europe); James A. Phills et al.,
Rediscovering Social Innovation, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2008, at
34, 36 (“[S]ocial innovation is the best construct . . . [for] lasting social
change.”).
112. Henn, supra note 1 (explaining that the idea of “[s]haring is not
exactly new,” but technological advances have accelerated the sharing
economy through the use of online platforms).
113. Id. (citing examples of technology that permit users to “see more than
we could see before,” increasing access and making “sharing all sorts of things
simple”).
114. See, e.g., id. (discussing how smartphone applications specifically that
have made old concepts of “sharing” more accessible); cf. Nicholas A. Ashford
& George R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the
Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112 (1983) (arguing that
one can predict what future technical innovation is likely to occur by
“understanding the dynamics of that technology”).
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difficult to capture.115 This difficulty results from the fact that
social innovation is not tangible.116
Social innovation is in itself not a recent phenomenon.117
Examples of hospices, mutual aid associations, and benefit
societies can be traced back centuries.118 Still, the emergence of
social innovation detached from religious institutions, as a new
field, is a recent idea.119 In the European Union, social
innovation has been described as the “design and
implementation of creative ways of meeting social needs.”120 A
true social innovation is generated when the benefits to society
of a product or process have substantially more social than
private value, when the added value to society is greater than
the gains to entrepreneurs.121
The distinctive character of social innovation relies on the
inventor’s main intrinsic motivation: social change.122 The
social value generated by socially innovative programs or
policies is not a mere byproduct, but rather its primary goal.123
This is visible in a number of sharing economy enterprises,
particularly in non-profit organizations.124 Accordingly, social
innovation has been defined as “a novel solution to a social
problem that is more effective, efficient, [and]
sustainable . . . than existing solutions and for which the value
created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than
115. See generally EUR. COMM’N, supra note 111, at 9 (arguing that in
Europe there is a lack of clarity regarding social innovation).
116. See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing a project to increase interaction between
generations, where it was difficult to quantify precisely the social innovation).
117. Id. at 9.
118. See STEVEN E. EPSTEIN, WAGE LABOR AND GUILDS IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE (1991) (discussing the history of wage guilds in medieval Europe,
which served as inspiration for modern benefit societies); see also LORIE
CHARLESWORTH, WELFARE’S FORGOTTEN PAST: A SOCIO-LEGAL HISTORY OF
THE POOR LAW (2010).
119. See EUR. COMM’N, supra note 111, at 9 (“A ‘field’ of social innovation,
however, is a new idea.”).
120. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 77.
121. Phills et al., supra note 111, at 36.
122. See Clayton Christensen et al., Disruptive Innovation for Social
Change, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 94, 96.
123. Id. at 96 (“With catalytic innovations, however, social change is the
primary objective.”).
124. See, e.g., id. at 97–98 (describing social innovations by nonprofits in
the health care and education fields).
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private individuals.”125 Under this broad definition, different
types of social innovation are captured, such as fair trade
labeling, laws and policies promoting integration of minorities
or reducing poverty, and collaborative consumption
initiatives.126 Common examples of social innovation in the
United States and Europe are local partnerships and initiatives
that target social exclusion, homelessness, overcrowded or poor
conditions in prisons, orphanages, and barriers to labor
integration of non-qualified young adults.127
In a time of economic crisis, both technological and social
innovation should be stimulated.128 Diverse forms of the
sharing economy and collaborative consumption innovative
practices are often not profit-driven.129 Instead, they are
designed to improve access to shareable goods that would
otherwise be inaccessible to the poorest, combat individualism,
and empower communities.130 Cooperative enterprises between
neighbors to share items, babysit children, or provide
assistance to the elderly are some examples of innovations that
oblige us to think out of the box of business innovation.131
Instead of analyzing technological innovation in itself (the
platform used to connect users of sharing economy practices),
attention should be devoted to the service dimension of the
sharing economy’s innovations and its advantages and
disadvantages.132 Technology plays here a secondary role since
it is merely a facilitative element for the concretization of an
idea.
125. Phills et al., supra note 111, at 36.
126. E.g., id. at 40 (listing ten recent social innovations, including fair
trade labeling).
127. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 77.
128. Id. (“[F]inancial and economic crisis makes . . . social innovation in
particular even more important to foster sustainable growth, secure jobs and
boost competitiveness.”).
129. Cf. Phills et al., supra note 111, at 37 (explaining that the terms
associated with social innovation have historically “implicitly or explicitly
exclude[d] public and for-profit organizations”).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., id. at 26–27.
132. See, e.g., id. at 17–18 (focusing on the act of helping cancer patients in
their homes, as opposed to focusing on the software-as-a-service technology
that assists in communicating with those patients).
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Recognizing the nature of the innovation under analysis is
required not only to understand its elements, but also to decide
upon its regulatory regime.133 It is important to distinguish
between mainly socially innovative activities, which are not
primarily profit-oriented,134 and innovative activities that
might have a beneficial impact on a community, but at the
same time have become someone’s main source of income.135 In
the sharing economy, we can distinguish between occasional or
spontaneous transactions,136 daily profit-oriented
transactions,137 and solely non-profit oriented swaps or
practices to empower minorities or assist neighbors.138 In the
last case, the main goal of the initiative is to strengthen the
sense of community and learn from cultural exchange, it can be
qualified as a social innovation and should benefit from a less
stringent regulatory regime. The expectations of the parties
benefiting from these activities are in theory lower when
compared to hiring a professional service for the same purpose.
In the first and second cases, however, the social goals of the
sharing initiative may be diluted and confused with a profit-
driven activity.139 While the idea might remain innovative and
socially useful, it is important to ask whether the main goal of
those behind it is still social change, or profit.
C. THE CHALLENGES OF INNOVATION
In the European Union and the United States, the
promotion of innovation has been regarded as both an economic
133. See, e.g., Ashford & Hall, supra note 105, at 285 (describing concerns
particular to the fuel economy and emissions).
134. Community-centered planning is an example. See Phills et al., supra
note 111, at 40.
135. For example, fair trade coffee. See id. at 40.
136. For example, renting an extra room to guests for a number of limited
days or providing dinner to a couple of neighbors in exchange for
compensation once or twice a week Airbnb, which assists tenants in renting
their extra rooms for short periods, is an example of a spontaneous
transaction. See Yang, supra note 29.
137. For example, fair trade deals that require the producers of the product
to pay a living wage to their employees. See Phills et al., supra note 111, at 40.
138. For example, helping the elderly stay physically active. EUR. COMM’N,
supra note 111, at 26–27.
139. Cf. Phills, supra note 111, at 40 (discussing the blending of profit and
nonprofit companies, especially nonprofits considering business strategies and
for-profits considering their social impact).
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and social challenge.140 Innovation and entrepreneurship are
key elements to the enhanced competitiveness of European
firms and economic growth.141 Nonetheless, understanding the
significance of innovation for the economy, defining the
relationship between technological innovation and economic
growth, and calculating the commercial potential of an
innovation in light of existing uncertainty, have not been
simple tasks.142 From a societal perspective, innovation in
social services and structures is expected to solve the problems
resulting from an increasingly individualist society, yet an
accurate definition of the concept of social innovation appears
to be an obstacle to the definition of innovation policy.143
A third dimension must be added to the economic and
social challenges of innovation: the regulatory facet. Regulating
social and technological innovation with little information on
the novelties in question and their effects and side effects,
poses significant challenges to regulators.144 This can be
explained by the difficulty in finding the balance between the
need to encourage innovation, and the respect for legal
principles and norms.145 An increasing number of
governmental policies have aimed to promote innovation in the
last decade through innovation-oriented policy.146 Most of these
policies have been based on economic incentives.147 However,
this economic approach is only one of the available forms used
to influence the behavior of private actors; information transfer
140. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 56, at 1–2.
141. See id. at 3, 368–74 (“Innovation is a key driver of growth and
innovative ideas for the future of Europe.”).
142. See Bart Verspagen, Innovation and Economic Growth, in THE
OXFORDHANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 62, at 487.
143. Cf. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 111, at 9 (discussing misconceptions and
confusion associated with the term social innovation).
144. See HASAN BAKHSHI ET AL., STATE OF UNCERTAINTY: INNOVATION
POLICY THROUGH EXPERIMENTATION 5 (2011), available at
http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/state_of_uncertainty.pdf (arguing
that the main barriers to innovation policy have been “uncertainties
surrounding opportunities and constraints”).
145. Cf. id. (“Innovation policy remains rooted in a mix of traditional
industrial policy and an emerging new understanding [of innovation] . . . .”).
146. See id.
147. See id. (discussing innovation policy and its focus, inter alia, on
“incentive structures”).
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and the enactment of legislation with a stimulating character
can also be used to attain the same purpose.148
The option for any of these instruments depends on the
underlying objective, field in question, and level of intervention
required or intended (a subsidy might be sufficient when minor
or incremental developments are required).149 Economic
benefits do not always serve the mentioned objectives.150 In
fact, there appears to be an underinvestment in innovation in
fields that do not yield immediate economic benefits.151 This is
the case in environmental innovation and social innovation.152
In addition, there is insufficient regulation in this field because
it has been assumed that the law can do little to change the
behavior of private actors or to promote innovation. This is
likely the result of the insufficient empirical evidence to
demonstrate whether regulation can play a substantial role in
this field.153 Leaving innovation unregulated would be an
easier option, but it would also leave society exposed to a
number of undesirable risks.154 Regulation has been
traditionally thought of as an obstacle to innovation and
creativity: the law is about routine and regulation, defining
boundaries and standardizing procedures, whereas innovation
emerges from freedom, room for new ideas, and openness to
148. Id. at 8–9 (arguing that innovation policy “will be improved if its main
focus is information discovery”); Ashford & Hall, supra note 105, at 274
(arguing that regulations can “stimulate significant technological changes”).
149. See Knut Blind, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation 3–5 (Nesta,
Working Paper No. 12/02, 2012), available at http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites
/default/files/the_impact_of_regulation_on_innovation.pdf (discussing the
impact of social regulation on innovation).
150. See id.
151. See BAKHSHI ET AL. supra note 144, at 10 (explaining that traditional
innovation policies lead to “sub-optimal investment” because of “weak price
incentives for individual businesses”).
152. See generally Ashford & Hall, supra note 105 (discussing regulation in
the context of environmental regulation).
153. Contra Blind, supra note 149, at 16–19 (discussing net positive effects
from empirical evidence relating to environmental regulations).
154. See Ashford & Hall, supra note 105, at 271 (discussing that some have
cautioned that globalization in the environmental and labor fields has the
potential to create “race to the bottom”).
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diversity.155 However, a balance between these two dimensions
must be found.
The advancement of innovation in the current times of
economic crisis and in the near future might actually require
rethinking and redesigning the role of law and its legislative
and regulatory instruments in the process of innovation.156
This is justified, on the one hand, by the increasing government
cuts in R&D, support to social institutions, and other
innovation related investments, which have called for the
enactment of cheaper strategies to spur innovation,157 or at
least for the acceptance of innovative practices that deviate
from traditional standards. Reducing the regulatory burdens
imposed on innovators might be a relatively efficient strategy
to release more time and private funds for investment in
R&D.158 On the other hand, the 2008 credit crunch revealed the
shortcomings of conventional financial theory based on models
of strong reliance on economic policy instruments and
principles-based regulation deprived of effective regulatory
enforcement.159 This approach failed to keep up with financial
innovation, follow the complexity of financial markets, and
generate the trust of investors.160 In addition, innovation
appears to be posing novel and more complex challenges to
regulation, crossing borders that were once thought to be
insurmountable.161
155. Shubha Ghosh, Introduction: Can We Incentivize Creativity and
Entrepreneurship, in CREATIVITY, LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 3 (Shubha
Ghosh & Robin P. Malloy eds., 2011).
156. See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 77 (discussing the
relevance of innovation in times of “financial and economic crisis”).
157. See Blind, supra note 149, at 18 (arguing that public R&D is not
conducive to innovation in energy policy, whereas tax incentives and tradable
certificates are).
158. See generally id. at 19 (depicting the costs of regulation of
environmental protection, workers’ health and safety, and product and
consumer safety).
159. Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self-Regulation: What
Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis?, 11 GER. L.J. 230, 230–232 (2010).
160. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern
Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 235 (2012).
161. See id. at 335 (“[C]onventional financial theory failed to adequately
account for . . . the nature and pace of financial innovation.”).
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One of the most relevant challenges encountered by
regulators when asked to regulate innovation is uncertainty.162
Innovation does not come fully labeled or with a manual of
instructions. Even after laboratory tests, regulators might still
lack information regarding the effects and side effects of the
introduction of a new product or service in the market.163
Up until now, regulation has played a modest role in the
life of the sharing economy.164 However, protests and
controversies associated with sharing economy practices appear
to be calling for a regulatory intervention.165 Are we on the
verge of witnessing the emergence of a new field of law for
innovation? Or do we only have to learn how to adapt our
current rules to a world where we share instead of own? This is
the topic of Part III.
III. WHERE LAW AND INNOVATION MEET
In recent years, legislators and regulators have become
increasingly curious as to the regulation of innovation.166
However, this curiosity has not always put legislators and
regulators on the innovation path.167 Despite large annual
investments in R&D, too little has been researched and is
known about the most adequate and efficient mix of legal and
policy instruments to promote innovation.168 Even worse, laws
often impose costly burdens on innovators that stifle
innovation, impede entrepreneurship, or influence innovators
162. See generally Verspagen, supra note 142 (discussing uncertainty in
the context of innovations).
163. Cf. Slappendel, supra note 106, at 123 (arguing that researchers are
limited by their “own cognitive abilities” and can “only process so much
information within a given time frame”).
164. See generally The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1 (arguing
that the sharing economy is now developed enough “for regulators and
companies to have woken up to it”).
165. See, e.g., Scott & Eddy, supra note 17 (discussing the opposition Uber
has faced in Germany from the taxi industry and how the taxi industry is
calling for Uber to be regulated); see also supra notes 15, 16 and accompanying
text.
166. See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, supra note 56, at 1–2 (describing the concern
of the European Union regarding how to “tackle the ‘innovation emergency’ it
is facing”).
167. See generally Bernstein, supra note 36 (canvassing debates among
regulators, legislators, judges, and the public on how to regulate innovation).
168. Id. at 2258–60, 2266–70.
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to shop for jurisdictions offering innovation friendly legal
conditions.169 The same goes for the advancement of innovation
through legislative instruments. For many years, the law was
simply told to stay away from innovation to avoid impeding
it.170 However, beyond laboratories, laborious inventions, and
serendipitous discoveries, law can play a greater role than a
mere walk-on in the innovation film. In fact, law can act as a
driver of innovation,171 but we are still far from knowing what
innovation-friendly rules should look like. Reaching this final
destination may involve adopting a “comprehensive,
complicated ‘mix’ of federal institutions,” context-specific
instruments, multiple funding choices,172 and the use of both
economic and legal instruments (if not to stimulate, then at
least to guide innovation).173
Government intervention in innovation might have costly
results, if incorrectly targeted.174 The absolute lack of rules can
also be undesirable, opening the doors to conflicts between
innovation and other values. This is particularly true when it
comes to the inevitable relationship between legal conditions
and innovation, since the lack of an effective legal framework
169. See, e.g., Maria Sutton, Copyright Provisions in the TPP Would Stifle
Innovation and Impede the Economy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 6,
2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/copyright-provisions-tpp-would
-stifle-innovation-and-impede-economy (arguing that the suggested legal
protections will block innovation and fair competition).
170. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 36, at 2264–65 (citing arguments of
scholars who assert that innovation can be achieved without legal protection,
and that intellectual property legal regimes in particular “inhibit innovation
because they raises the costs of future innovations”).
171. See id. (discussing the academic debate surrounding the ability of law
to act as a catalyst or an impediment of innovation).
172. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (with
Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L. J. 1087, 1093 (2013).
173. See id. at 1092–93 (describing various options the government may
take in promoting innovation).
174. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking
the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 347
n.2 (2000) (detailing criticism for the Bayh-Dole Act); cf. Bernstein, supra note
36, at 2264 (detailing arguments of legislators who were concerned that
certain copyright legislation would curtail innovation).
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in the poorest countries is the main obstacle to innovation and
consequently to economic growth.175
The relationship between the law, regulation, and
innovation can have three outcomes. First, regulation can
hinder innovation by placing excessive burdens on
entrepreneurs.176 This is the case of licenses on industries or
entry requirements177 or by forbidding, often on a
precautionary basis, the production of new products due to
their potential risks.178 Innovation can also be frustrated by the
very same laws that are aimed to promote it.179 Second, law
and regulation may facilitate the introduction of innovations in
the market, notably by waiving requirements or the observance
of standards, granting exemptions, or authorizing companies to
develop novel activities and projects on a temporary or
permanent basis.180 Third, regulation can have no direct effect
on innovation and only accidentally foster it, since innovation
might simply emerge serendipitously.181
175. Robert Cooter, Innovation, Information, and the Poverty of Nations, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (“[S]ystematic defects in the legal
institutions of poor countries retard innovation and keep countries poor.”).
176. See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing
Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1689, 1695 (2007) (“The current regulatory model stands as a
tremendous barrier to innovation . . . .”); see also Bernstein, supra note 36, at
2264–65.
177. See Hadfield, supra note 176, at 1690–95 (arguing that excessive self-
regulation of the legal profession annihilates any margin of creativity in legal
services and the development of innovation).
178. See, e.g., id. at 1706 (“The market for corporate legal products and
services is one of the most heavily regulated in the economy.”).
179. See STEWART, supra note 91, at 3 fig. 1 (illustrating how a regulation
may either burden or promote innovation); see also Blind, supra note 149, at
19 (depicting the positive and negative effects of laws on innovation).
180. See, e.g., Ian M. Ramsay, Financial Innovation and Regulation: The
Case of Securitisation, J. BANKING& FIN. L. & PRAC. 169, 173 (1993) (claiming
that Australian mortgage-back securitization programs that exempt the issue
and transfer of securities in a part of the country from stamp duty have
“promoted financial innovation”).
181. E.g., STEWART, supra note 91, at 17 (more stringent emissions
standards “had no effect on innovation in Japan and Germany”); see, e.g., EUR.
COMM’N, GUIDELINES ON PROGRAMMING FOR INNOVATION AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EIP FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY 3 (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/eip/agriculture
/sites/agri-eip/files/eip-guidelines-july-2014_en.pdf/ (discussing how innovation
is often a result of “accidental external factors”).
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There is not one formula to produce innovation, and if
there is, it is not a one-ingredient recipe. Innovation is not
always the mere and direct result of investment.182 Creativity,
entrepreneurship, and ultimately innovation result from an
innovation-friendly climate that is composed of both internal
and external elements.183 The emergence of innovation can be
influenced both by the dynamics of the innovation process
(including how much one invests in it), and institutional
governance and regulatory elements that may either hinder,
delay, or advance innovation.184 The latter refers also to the
way regulators see innovation, understand its complexities,
interact with innovators, regulate it, and above all, think
forward without regulating backwards.185
Up until recently, the institutional governance and
regulatory elements have received limited attention from the
legal literature, which has narrowed the study of innovation to
IP, and in certain cases to competition law.186 Regulators
should think outside of this box, by trying to understand the
challenges of innovation to traditional regulatory instruments
and institutions—including how to marry the fast-changing
character of innovation with the need for predictability and
legal certainty, bridge innovation with regulatory procedure
and requirements, understand how charity and philanthropy
are permeating the legal sphere, and convince legislators and
regulators to accommodate and incentivize social innovation.
182. Cf. Ashford & Heaton, supra note 114, at 131 (“Some have suggested
that there was overinvestment in R&D during the 1960’s . . . .”).
183. See Blind, supra note 149, at 26–27 (offering suggestions on multiple
factors that may generate “innovation-friendly” policy); see also EUR. COMM’N,
supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. See Blind, supra note 149, at 19, 26–27.
185. See id; see also Bernstein, supra note 36, at 2265–67.
186. See, e.g., OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM
(Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West eds., Oxford University Press 2006)
(discussing “open innovation” in the context of intellectual property law);
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A.
Paredas eds., Cambridge University Press 2012) (discussing innovation in the
context of intellectual property laws and providing insights to improving
innovation); Bernstein, supra note 36 (discussing innovation in the context of
intellectual property law); Robert D. Cooter, Legalize Freedom, in
COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING
INNOVATION 39 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011).
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A. A CHALLENGING RELATIONSHIP
The regulation of innovation or the advancement of
innovation through regulation has often been criticized and
qualified as a true dichotomy: innovation is a fast-changing and
fluid reality that does not pair well with rigid, top-down
rules.187 Nonetheless, even critics of the regulation of
innovation admit that it is necessary, both because the lack of
an effective legal framework can be the main obstacle to
innovation and economic growth,188 and because the
alternative, case-by-case-litigation, “can easily prove to be
worse.”189
The awareness that the government should intervene in
the regulation and promotion of innovation is insufficient. In
some cases, governments try to promote innovation without
first understanding what it truly implies, which can result in
the enactment of laws that place too many burdens on
innovators, stifling innovation instead of stimulating it.190 In
other cases, the lack of knowledge as to what the innovation
process entails can be visible in the development of innovation
policies that are costly but incorrectly targeted.191
The path to “innovation-friendly law” may be tortuous, but
it is a road we have to follow, particularly in the case of the
sharing economy. The next subsection discusses the questions
one might ask to grasp the essence of innovation and provide
187. Martin Eifert, Innovationsfördernde Regulierung, in
INNOVATIONSFÖRDERNDE REGULIERUNG: INNOVATION UND RECHT II 11, 16
(Martin Eifert & Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem eds., 2009) (Ger.); see BAKHSHI ET
AL., supra note 144, at 8 (cautioning against “the rigid costs associated with
state bodies” when developing innovation policy); Ashford & Heaton, supra
note 114, at 115 (“There is the danger, however, that regulations
themselves . . . may modify the operating constraints of an industry in such a
way as to fix them more rigidly.”).
188. Cooter, supra note 175, at 374; see e.g., Ashford & Heaton, supra note
114, at 115 (describing regulation as a force that may “stimulate rivalry, new
entrants, and the search for technological solutions” in innovative industries).
189. Richard A. Epstein, Can Technological Innovation Survive
Government Regulation?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 87 (2013).
190. Michael A. Carrier, Increasing Innovation Through Copyright:
Common Sense and Better Government Policy, 62 EMORY L.J. 983, 983–84
(2013) (criticizing vague copyright law and suggesting the elimination of
statutory damages and personal liability in cases of secondary infringement).
191. Frischmann, supra note 174 (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act regime
and intellectual property is a poor way for government to promote innovation).
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innovation-friendly regulations. I argue for a new field of law
that understands how the innovation process works and tries to
answer accordingly.
B. INNOVATION LAW
Innovation law is a field of research pretty much in its
infancy.192 This field of research tries to understand innovation,
its multiple facets, and how different legal instruments can be
employed to regulate and facilitate innovation.193 An
innovation law approach can be beneficial since it tries to think
in abstract about the goals that are common to different fields,
reflecting about the influence that law can have on elements
such as creativity or entrepreneurship.194
Real-world innovations (and their problems) emerge in
different shapes and sizes, transcending artificially delineated
fields of law and policy. Solving these problems implies a
coordination and commitment across agencies that might be
difficult to achieve.195 This perspective acknowledges the main
challenges of regulating innovation—the uncertainty,
complexity, and temporary nature—and the need to find a
balance between the desire to advance innovation and the
observance of legal rules and principles.196 These are aspects
that also characterize the sharing economy.197 Before analyzing
potential and specific regulatory solutions for the sharing
economy, I introduce some guidelines of innovation law.
192. LOBEL, supra note 42, at 39; Sarnoff, supra note 172, at 1149
(discussing how efforts to analyze whether certain legal regimes “provide the
best balance of incentives and access to promote both static and dynamic
innovation” are still in their infancy).
193. See Sarnoff, supra note 172.
194. See id. at 1096–97 (discussing analyses of determinants of creativity
across “different settings, fields, and geographies,” including, inter alia, “legal
conditions”).
195. MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING
RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 208 (Brookings
Institution 2000).
196. See JOE TIDD, IMPERIAL LONDON COLL., INNOVATION MODELS 3
(2006), available at http://www.emotools.com/media/upload/files/innovation
_models.pdf; supra note 187 and accompanying text.
197. See EUR. COMM’N, BUSINESS INNOVATION OBSERVATION: THE
SHARING ECONOMY 14 (2013) (asserting that complexity and uncertainty has
been an obstacle for the sharing economy).
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1. Uncertainty
The concept of innovation is often associated with
indeterminate realities: the unknown, yet to be discovered, or
the surprisingly new. Uncertainty is present throughout the
entire innovative process and can be translated into multiple
questions.198 Will a certain type of sharing economy practice
work? Will it improve access to certain services? What are the
risks implied in this practice? Should this activity be
regulated? These questions arise because innovation implies
both inherent and external uncertainties. The inherent
uncertainties are connected with the process of innovation and
the unpredictability of its outcomes; whereas external
uncertainties refer to the regulatory framework or the
necessary conditions to enable the introduction of innovative
products or services in the market.199
Uncertainty impacts the regulation of innovation and the
innovation process in multiple ways.200 External regulatory
uncertainty can have a strong impact on the incentives to
innovate, particularly when the time span to develop profitable
technology or, in the case of the sharing economy, valuable
social practices, is more significant.201 This happens in the case
of uncertainty regarding the regulatory delay:202 if firms do not
know when and if their products or services will be authorized
and how they will be regulated, the incentives to invest may
decrease.203 Regulatory delays are costly and, whenever the
product introduction benefits decrease progressively, such
198. See Nelson & Winter, supra note 52.
199. Ashford & Heaton, supra note 114, at 128–29 (discussing both
financial and regulatory uncertainties that contribute to risk in developing
new products); Ronald R. Braeutigam, The Effect of Uncertainty in the
Regulatory Delay on the Rate of Innovation, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 98,
98 (1979).
200. See Braeutigam, supra note 199 and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. Regulatory delay refers to the period of time between the moment a
firm requests the approval of a new product or the regulation of a new service
and its administrative approval or enactment of the respective regulation. See
James E. Prieger, Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation, 25
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 219, 220 (2007).
203. Id. (stating that regulatory delays distort the incentives to introduce
new products at all).
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delay can be extremely costly.204 Excessive regulatory
uncertainty is detrimental to innovation, since it can result in
industry inaction.205
In sum, uncertainty is an inherent and accepted part of the
innovation process. However, innovators do not welcome
excessive regulatory uncertainty, regulatory delays, or constant
and incoherent legislative reviews as the response to the
uncertainties of the innovation process.206 Consumers and
users of sharing economy practices might also be reluctant to
participate in these activities if they are not provided with a
minimum of guarantees—for example, that they will arrive
safe and sound at their destination, in the case of Uber, or that
the risk of food poisoning is limited, in the case of the meal
sharing apps.207
2. Complexity
The second concept of innovation law is that innovation is
a complex phenomenon: it can be a process or a result, a
product or a service, a technology or social novelty.208
Innovation law should be open to all these dimensions of the
innovation process and choose regulatory instruments that
respond adequately to the complexities of the reality in
question.209 John Braithwaite argues that complex phenomena
should be regulated by principles instead of rules, which may
be more adequate for simple realities.210 This complexity of
innovation is also visible in the multiplicity of institutions
involved.211 Institutions play a very important role in
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See Ann Farmer, Making Reservations for Leftovers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
23, 2012, 1:53 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/leftovers
-made-to-share-with-strangers/; Henn, supra note 1 (explaining an app called
“Feastly,” that “allows any chef to market and serve a meal to any hungry
eater”).
208. See Phills, supra note 111, at 37 (“Innovation is both a process and a
product.”).
209. See id.
210. John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty,
27 AUSTL J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 47, 52 (2002).
211. Id. at 52 (discussing increasing difficulty when disputes involve more
than “individual action”).
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innovation. The encouragement of innovation is executed by a
mix of institutional arrangements, which involve the higher
education system and multiple publicly funded instruments,
such as R&D grants, tax incentives, government subsidies,
procurement policies, and intellectual property rights.212
Innovation should be thus encouraged by a mix of public and
private instruments that are coherent and aligned to respond
to the challenges of innovation.213
In light of this complexity, innovation should be perceived
as a multicephalous creature. It is pursued as a private good
but it has a public good nature.214 If the incentives to innovate
are low, it may require, under certain circumstances, ex ante
public law incentives215 (e.g., tax incentives) but its future
subsistence may as well be dependent on patents or other IP
rights.
In addition, the regulation of innovation may be hard or
soft;216 technology- or information-forcing217 or adaptable;218
public, private, or hybrid.219 Innovation law perceives
innovation as an isolated and complex phenomenon and accepts
212. Simon Deakin & Andrea Mina, Institutions and Innovation: Is
Corporate Governance the Missing Link?, in BUSINESS INNOVATION AND THE
LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LABOUR, COMPETITION
AND CORPORATE LAW 456, 458 (Marilyn Pittard et al. eds., 2013).
213. See id.
214. Frischmann, supra note 174, at 357–58.
215. Joshua Chao, Tax Incentives for Innovation in a Modern IP Ecosystem,
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 753, 771–81 (2013); Daniel. J. Hemel & Lisa
Larimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303,
304–06 (2013).
216. Cf. Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying
Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483,
522 (2009) (explaining differences between hard and soft regulation in the
area of international relations).
217. See, e.g., Ashford & Heaton, supra note 114, at 110; Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 861 (2006).
218. E.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy:
A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008); Cooter et al., supra
note 54; Floor Fleurke & Han Somsen, Precautionary Regulation of Chemical
Risk: How REACH Confronts the Regulatory Challenges of Scale, Uncertainty,
Complexity and Innovation, 48 COMMONMARKET L. REV. 357 (2011).
219. See Sarnoff, supra note 172, at 1089–90 (discussing different
strategies of fostering innovation, including private, public, and “hybrid”
approaches).
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its complexity by opening the doors to a myriad of regulatory
instruments. Nothing new here, one could argue. However, the
“newness” of my argument lies in the fact that we should shift
the focus of our analysis from specific technology-related
aspects to the main challenge of regulating innovation:
uncertainty. It is because a phenomenon is new that we do not
know how to regulate it.220
3. Temporariness and Flexibility
As mentioned earlier, innovation is a complex, fluid, and
moving target.221 Law will necessarily lag behind innovation
since it cannot be adapted at innovation’s speed.222 “Product
cycles in technology are faster than justice . . . . [The innovator
is] always already in credit.”223 Nevertheless, even if law does
not have the pretension to regulate the latest fashion in the
world of technologies, it should be open and responsive to
innovation. In addition, it has been claimed, in literature
focused on the regulation of telecommunications, that
regulatory resilience and the development of an adaptive
policymaking and regulation paradigm are essential for the
advance of sustainable policies.224 Regulators and policymakers
should act as “adaptive agents” who adjust regulations and
policies according to the evolution of the markets and
technologies.225 According to Richard Whitt, the “adaptive
regulator” must be guided by nine principles, including: an
incremental approach, meaning that small steps should be
taken and social change should be based on experience; an
experimental approach, justified by the “combination of
uncertainty and constraints on predictability [which] create[]
220. See, e.g., Whitt supra note 216, at 524, 549 (noting that “we can only
guess at the extent of our ignorance, realizing that we are almost certain to be
confronted with unknown unknowns” and that “creative breakthroughs
typically involve leaps into the unknown.”).
221. See Parts I.B, II.A.
222. See generally JOHANNA GIBSON, THE LOGIC OF INNOVATION:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND WHAT THE USER FOUND THERE (Ashgate
2014).
223. Id. at 48.
224. See Barbara A. Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential
Industries Under Complexity: Providing Resilience Within the Rule of Law, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 2–3 (2008); Whitt, supra note 216, at 485–87.
225. Whitt, supra note 216, at 496–98.
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the necessity for policymakers to experiment;” and a flexible
approach, required by the existence of deep uncertainty.226 In
the context of telecommunications and other sectors
characterized by rapid evolution and uncertainty, Whitt argues
that policymakers should possess the flexibility to revise and
adapt the structure of policies and programs to changing
circumstances.227
Regulatory flexibility is equally necessary to face
informational problems characterizing the innovation process.
If innovation is selected as the primary regulatory purpose, its
concretization can be achieved by dividing the regulatory
process in multiple stages, and structuring it in a way to
incorporate new knowledge as more information becomes
available. When regulators are confronted with the need to
regulate a novel sharing economy practice, they could allow for
an “incubating period” by experimenting with a new temporary
rule on a small-scale basis.228 During this period, regulators
should gather further information as to the innovation itself as
well as to the effects of the regulation in question.229 The use of
experimental regulations that are not enacted forever, but only
for a short period of time, will be evaluated at the end of the
experimental period, and can be later adapted so as
accommodate the gathered evidence.230
Yair Listokin argues that adapting laws and regulations to
the changing times and to new information can actually
contribute to finding optimal policy solutions.231 Relying on
Edmund Burke, Listokin claims that new policies should only
be partially implemented, submitted for evaluation, then
226. Id. at 500–05.
227. Id. at 497–99.
228. See Sofia Ranchordás, Experimental Legislation: The Whys and the
Woes, 1 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 415 (2013) (analyzing, briefly, some
experimental legislation); see also SOFIA RANCHORDÁS, CONSTITUTIONAL
SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION (forthcoming) (offering a more
extensive analysis of sunset clauses and experimental legislation and their
constitutional limits from a comparative perspective).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480,
484 (2008) (“[O]ptimal search theory favors high-variance policies, because
variance increase the probability of finding excellent policies.”).
2015] SHARING AND CARING 451
changed if necessary or terminated.232 Regulators can increase
flexibility of regulations to accompany the pace of innovation
both by including a sunset clause—which predetermines their
expiry at the end of a certain period—or by experimenting with
new rules.233 In the first case, regulators predict fast and
disruptive changes in technology and society, which may imply
a thorough redesign of regulations.234 In such a scenario,
regulators are better off allowing regulations to be terminated.
In the second case, where regulators predict incremental
innovations and consequently the need to promote a continuous
process of regulatory experimentation and learning,
experimental regulations might be a better choice.235 Without
going into further detail as to these two legislative
instruments, it is important to mention that regulators should
convert the process of regulating innovation into a learning
process. By experimenting, policymakers and regulators can
draw valuable lessons from their own legislative acts and later
change these laws accordingly.236 This reversibility can be
namely created by introducing sunset clauses in legislative
acts.237 In some sense, almost all policies have a certain degree
of irreversibility since their impact on society and economy
cannot be erased. However, the adoption of a sunset clause can
ensure that laws and policies automatically lapse when they
are unable to keep up with the current state of technology and
society.
Terminating regulations by employing sunset clauses or by
experimenting on a small-scale can be useful to ensure that
rules keep up with the changes in technology and society. In
addition, when little information regarding the potential risks
of a new sharing economy practice and regulators do not wish
to stifle this innovation by enacting stringent regulation,
experimenting with new regulations may be a wiser response.
232. Id. at 488.
233. Id. at 535.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 488.
236. Id. at 485.
237. Id. at 485–86.
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C. TRAVELING BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Having accepted the complex nature of innovation, the
innovation law perspective adopted in this Article goes forward
by expanding its scope. Because there is innovation beyond
intellectual property (IP), there should also be rules to tackle
innovation beyond this field of law. Innovation outside IP
results from the definition of innovation, presented above,238
that not all forms of innovation are deserving of a patent. This
is particularly true in the field of sharing economy.239 However,
this does not mean that law should turn its back on it.240
Innovation law is still in its infancy since the existing studies
on innovation and law are usually not studied within a wider
regulatory context.241 IP appears to be the first—and often the
only—acronym that comes to our mind when we are told that
the encouragement of innovation implies the enactment of
specific rules. Some of us might even whisper “‘competition
laws,” thinking about the well-known Microsoft case.242
Administrative authorities are aware of the importance of
innovation for a country’s competitiveness and have tried
(though sometimes haphazardly) to actively encourage firms to
innovate.243 This was the case when the U.S. Department of
Justice commanded Microsoft to sell its Internet Explorer as a
separate product from its Windows operating system.244 This
idea that authorities should actively intervene can be also
indirectly derived from the “Porter hypothesis,”245 according to
which public authorities, and specifically competition
238. See supra text accompanying note 74.
239. E.g., WOLFGANG HOESCHELE, THE ROLE OF THE COMMONS AND
COMMON PROPERTY IN AN ECONOMY OF ABUNDANCE (n.d.), available at
http://www.icape.org/b5-Hoeschele.pdf (arguing that the sharing economy is a
good example of an area where a lack of patentability has not diminished
innovation).
240. See id.
241. See LOBEL, supra note 42; Müller, supra note 69.
242. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
243. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION:
SECURING OUR ECONOMICGROWTH AND PROSPERITY 2–6 (2011).
244. Lawrence B. Landman, Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the
Innovation Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets
as the “Centerpiece” of “New Thinking” on Innovation, 13 ST. JOHN’S J.L.
COMM. 223, 226 (1998).
245. See Ashford & Hall, supra note 105, at 276–77; Michael Porter, The
Competitive Advantage of Nations, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 73, 86–88 (1990).
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authorities, should guarantee that market forces drive firms to
innovate, namely through the implementation of stringent
competition policy.246
The concretization of legislative or administrative
interventions in this field does not always need and cannot
always be reduced to an aggressive implementation of
competition law. Innovation is essential to increase the
competitiveness of firms, but the regulation of innovation goes
beyond competition concerns and requires a comprehensive
regulatory approach.247 Furthermore, this limited approach to
innovation leaves unregulated a new body of innovative
practices in social fields, which, as stated above, are not always
patentable.248
Gone are the days when patents were regarded as the only
legal mechanism to incentivize innovation249 and when
innovation was mainly related to solitary garage inventors.250
Not only has the impact of IP law been contested in the last
years, but we have also become aware of the fact that other
fields of law may equally promote or impede innovation.251 This
is the case of immigration laws that, if well targeted, can
attract high-skilled immigrants and entrepreneurs that can be
a source of strength for innovative competitiveness.252 This has
been, for example, the rationale behind the StartUp Visa Act of
2013, a bill meant to amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act in order to attract entrepreneurs that can create much
246. Porter, supra note 245, at 87 (“Government’s proper role is as a
catalyst and challenger; it is to encourage—or even push—companies to raise
their aspirations and move to higher levels of competitive performance . . . .”);
see Ashford & Hall, supra note 105, at 276–77.
247. See Porter, supra note 245.
248. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 239.
249. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is it
the Best Incentive System?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51
(Adam B. Jaffe & J. Lerner eds., 2002) (“Intellectual property is not the only
mechanism used in the American economy for rewarding R&D.”); Hemel,
supra note 215, at 304–05.
250. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 518–23
(2013) (discussing changes in the view of the “garage inventor” as the
“American icon”).
251. See id. (discussing the impact of certain legislation on the ability of
individuals to be innovators).
252. See, e.g., StartUp Visa Act of 2013, S. 189, 113th Cong. (2013).
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needed jobs in America.253 In Canada, the Startup Business
Visa has been recently enacted and promises to be “the first of
its kind,” linking immigrant entrepreneurs with Canadian
private sector organizations.254 Immigrant entrepreneurs must
be able to demonstrate that their business ideas are supported
by a local organization, meet language and education
requirements, and have sufficient settlement funds.255 An
attractive aspect of this visa is the fact that the failure of the
startup shall not affect the permanent resident status of the
applicant.256 While this and other legislative initiatives to
attract entrepreneurs may have in theory undoubted benefits,
they may also carry implementation risks and costs. Are the
criteria to qualify for a visa not too onerous? Should the effort
to try to raise capital not be rewarded? Would looser criteria
open a Pandora’s box to immigration services?
Another objection to the excessive focus on the study of IP
in the context of law and innovation relates to the limits of the
field: a number of innovations that surround us cannot be
protected by IP rights.257 This refers both to technological and
social innovations.258 However, the more complex examples
come from the field of social innovation: local initiatives
organized by college students to empower minorities, teach
immigrants English, or develop innovative forms of
encouraging businesses that have a positive environmental and
social impact.259 These initiatives are often not eligible for IP
protection and do not attract the attention of lobbyists or even
powerful philanthropists, because they do not involve
significant profit.260 Nonetheless, these forms of innovation also
need rules. Rules that reflect an understanding of the nature of
253. Id.
254. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., CANADA WANTS ENTREPRENEURS!
(2013), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/startup-entrepreneurs
-eng.pdf.
255. Id.
256. If I Have a Start-Up Visa, What Happens If My Business Fails?, GOV’T
CANADA, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/helpcentre/answer.asp?q=657&t=6 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2014).
257. HOESCHELE, supra note 239 and accompanying text.
258. Id.
259. See id. (discussing how patents do not promote innovation as it relates
to social or environmental causes).
260. See id.
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the innovation process, do not lag behind innovation, do not
delay the authorization and commercialization of new products
and services, and do not send negative signals to the market.261
Rules that, at the same time, are stable and predictable enough
to transmit confidence to entrepreneurs, guarantee that
regulators do not authorize products that may pose a risk to
our health or environment, support innovators and
entrepreneurs without endangering other fundamental values
and principles of our legal order.262 Rules that are “innovation-
friendly” without being overambitious or overpessimistic about
the role to be played by regulation in the innovation process.263
IV. INNOVATION AND REGULATION IN THE SHARING
ECONOMY
Recent innovations in the field of the sharing economy
illustrate well the regulatory challenges faced by lawmakers
and regulators when asked to regulate innovation.264 Think
about Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb, symbols of contemporary
innovation and a new urban trend of sharing and
collaborating.265 In the world of the sharing economy, there
appear to be infinite possibilities to be an entrepreneur,266 play
taxi driver267 or handyman,268 turn your house into a hotel,269
261. JØRGEN ROSTED ET AL., NEW NATURE OF INNOVATION 12–13 (2009),
available at http://www.tem.fi/files/24835/New_Nature_of_Innovation.pdf
(providing suggestions for innovation policy).
262. Id.
263. THEWHITEHOUSE, supra note 243, at 10; see also id.
264. See supra Part I (discussing innovation in the sharing economy that
generated Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb).
265. See id.
266. See Gregory Ferenstein, Airbnb CEO Spells Out the End Game for the
Sharing Economy, in 7 Quotes, VENTUREBEAT (June 2014),
http://venturebeat.com/2014/07/02/airbnb-ceo-spells-out-the-end-game-for-the
-sharing-economy-in-7-quotes/ (predicting that the sharing economy will
create upwards of 100 million micro-entrepreneurs).
267. Rachelle Dragani, Uber Hustles to Buff Up Its Image,
E-COMMERCETIMES (Aug. 29, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://www.ecommercetimes
.com/story/80968.html.
268. E.g., HANDY.COM, http://www.handy.com/services (last visited Oct. 30,
2014).
269. E.g., How Do I Travel on Airbnb?, supra note 27.
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or connect with people with similar interests and needs.270 The
possibilities are infinite, and so are the risks of unregulated
practices and the concerns of municipalities, agencies, and tax
officers that are now obliged to understand unfamiliar business
schemes and adapt their rules to these new realities.271
Sharing practices are far from unique to the 21st
century.272 Instead, they are primitive practices that were
historically used to bind and connect communities, but became
diluted in our consumerist society, where we started gathering
goods for pleasure and showing off, forgetting the benefits of
sharing.273 Online platforms are taking us back to the time
when we used to trust strangers and offer them shelter and
food, trade goods with them to seal bonds of friendship, and
share items in order to avoid acquiring goods that we do not
need more than once or twice in a lifetime.274 Although sharing
practices have historical roots, they are reemerging and they
are blossoming thanks to new technologies that bring strangers
together and facilitate mutual trust.275 Trusting in the
kindness and honesty of strangers can be rewarding or
deceiving, which is why these practices are never risk-free.276
270. E.g., Serkan Toto, DOMO Lets You Share Your Interests and Connect
with New People Around You, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/10/domo-lets-you-share-your-interests-and-conn
ect-with-new-people-around-you/.
271. See, e.g., Shari Shapiro, Regulate the Sharing Economy Parent
Companies, Not Individual Providers, REG BLOG (Sept. 22,
2014), http://www.regblog.org/2014/09/22/22-shapiro-sharing-economy-part-ii/
(“Particularly when it comes to car services, municipalities are struggling with
the resources necessary to regulate thousands of independent drivers to
ensure that safety measures, insurance, licensing, and similar provisions are
in place.”).
272. Henn, supra note 1 (“Sharing is not exactly new.”); Gerard Ferrer,
History of Collaborative Consumption, COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (Jan.
28, 2014), http://blog.cronnection.com/collaborative-consumption/history-collab
orative-consumption/.
273. See Henn, supra note 1 (“In a sense it’s retro. It’s really like going
back to the way things used to be done, where you got to know each other and
you looked after your neighbors . . . . Only now it’s beginning to happen on a
global scale because of the Internet.”).
274. See id.
275. Id.; see, e.g., Dickey, supra note 80.
276. E.g., Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye from Driver’s Hammer
Attack. Could Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2014, 9:37 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack
-liability/; Farhad Manjoo, Renters from Hell: Airbnb and the Limits of Trust
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The following subsections elaborate on the sharing economy
and its differences from other socially innovative practices, the
novel risks in these practices and how online platforms and
regulators are taking action, and finally, whether these sharing
economy practices fit in the existing regulations.
A. THE SHARING ECONOMY AND THEOTHERS
While the sharing economy lacks a common definition,277 it
is often linked with concepts such as “collaborative
consumption,” “peer economy,” or “collaborative economy.”278
The common element to these phenomena is sharing, either for
monetary or non-monetary benefits.279 The sharing economy
can be placed in the context of a number of social initiatives
designed to empower communities and improve access to a
number of goods, services, and facilities that would otherwise
be restricted to the elite.280
1. Social Enterprises
While the sharing economy and other forms of
collaborative consumption remain fairly overlooked in the legal
literature, more attention has been paid to social enterprises.281
Social enterprise is a broader concept that refers to “any
business model that, to a significant degree, has a mission-
driven motive. This mission-driven motive may be exclusive of
a profit motive or blended with one.”282 This definition does not
depend on how the entity operates and pursues its mission-
driven motives.283 Social enterprises can be organized as
nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations, or even as hybrid forms of
Online, SLATE (Aug. 2, 2011, 5:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/technology/technology/2011/08/renters_from_hell.html.
277. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition,
FASTCOEXIST (Nov. 21, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com
/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition.
278. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 7.
279. See Botsman, supra note 277.
280. See MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION
DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 4–8 (2011) (describing other social initiatives that
use business to increase access to resources).
281. See id.
282. Id. at 7.
283. Id.
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profit-driven organizations.284 According to Nobel Prize winner
Muhammad Yunus, a “social business” should be “dedicated
entirely to achieving a social goal,” not profit.285 Social
enterprise and other social empowering practices are not only
connected with the idea of charity, but also “do[] good through
the application of sound business principles.”286 We easily
realize that social enterprise goes beyond the concept of the
sharing economy.287 In many cases, sharing economy practices
will not be formally organized as social enterprises.288 They are
often informal collaborative practices between individuals or
within communities, facilitated by online platforms.289
2. Collaborative Consumption
Collaborative consumption and sharing economy are often
considered to be synonyms.290 “Collaborative consumption” has
been defined in the literature as “a form of consumption where
people share consumption of goods and services online.”291 The
motivation to participate in these collaborative schemes may
vary from simply “doing good” to obtaining limited economic
benefits.292 However, Rachel Botsman argues that
“collaborative consumption” should be distinguished from “the
sharing economy” since the latter is largely a person-to-person
practice based on an economic model of sharing underutilized
assets such as spaces and skills for monetary or non-monetary
benefits.293 In the case of collaborative consumption, the
emphasis lies primarily in the idea of “sharing, swapping,
trading, or renting products and services.”294 Collaborative
284. Id.
285. Id. at 4.
286. Id. at 7.
287. See generally id. (discussing many types of businesses under the
umbrella of “social enterprise”).
288. See id.
289. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1 (discussing how the
Internet has made it easier for individuals to find and rent things from each
other).
290. Hamari et al., supra note 10; All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra
note 7.
291. Hamari, supra note 10, at 2.
292. Id. at 3.
293. Botsman, supra note 277.
294. Id.
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consumption (e.g., swap-trading, online platforms) often
implies a transfer of ownership, either temporary or
permanent; this does not occur in the sharing economy (e.g.,
Uber, Lyft, Zipcar).295 Despite this distinction, both forms of
collaborative practices bring similar risks for users296 and pose
comparable challenges to regulators.297
B. SHARING ISNOT ALWAYS CARING
The sharing economy appears to be an innovative idea that
we can only welcome. However, while numerous cosmopolitan
users might be open to the idea of sharing their rides, food, and
living rooms with strangers, others might furrow their
eyebrows just at the thought. Sharing economy practices are
not risk- or nuisance-free for their users or for third parties.298
An example of this is private kitchen offerings where one can
order dinner at a stranger’s place.299 While this might be
economical, restaurants have often complained that these
private kitchens are not licensed, not subject to health or safety
standards, and may put the health of customers at risk.300
Moreover, neighbors of Airbnb hosts around the world have
complained that they do not wish to transform their buildings
into hotels, sharing access to common facilities with total
strangers.301
These concerns have also drawn the attention of
regulators.302 In July 2014, the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission issued cease and desist orders in Pittsburgh to
Uber and Lyft.303 These orders were motivated by concerns
related to public safety since both companies were not
295. See id.
296. See supra note 276.
297. E.g., Shari Shapiro, supra note 271.
298. See Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 01, 2012, at B1; supra note 276.
299. See Farmer, supra note 207 (describing the meal sharing app, Mealku,
where one is able to purchase leftovers from a stranger’s home).
300. Id. (explaining that the meal swap app is not regulated by health
codes).
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Jessica Nath, PUC Issues Cease and Desist Orders for Uber,
Lyft, WESA (July 2, 2014, 3:30 PM), available at http://wesa.fm/post/puc
-issues-cease-and-desist-orders-uber-lyft.
303. Id.
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complying with a state law requiring a certificate of public
convenience granted by the Public Utility Commission.304
Sharing economy practices can raise multiple safety concerns
regarding the background checks of drivers and house hosts,
safety of vehicles and facilities, location of houses and the
position of neighbors, driving or other skills required for the
task, and sufficient insurance.305 In the case of Uber, the
company guarantees criminal background checks on all drivers,
and that all drivers have sufficient insurance and their vehicle
inspected.306 However, one may wonder how transparent and
rigorous these inspections and background checks are.307
Another question that may arise is whether these drivers
are self-employed entrepreneurs or under the control of Uber.
Uber has argued that the company is just creating a business
model and these drivers are independent.308 However, if
something goes wrong with this sharing practice, customers
might be better protected if Uber could be held liable.309 The
same argument goes for Airbnb: hosts are required to comply
with local regulations.310 Airbnb only facilitates the contact
304. Id.
305. E.g., Farmer, supra note 207 (showing health concerns); Nath, supra
note 302 (showing certification concerns); Scott & Eddy, supra note 17
(showing licensing and regulatory concerns).
306. Rider Safety, UBER, https://www.uber.com/en-US/safety (last visited
Nov. 4, 2014).
307. Jason Notte, Safety Worries Make Uber, Lyft Fair Game for Taxi
Watchdogs, STREET (Oct. 14, 2014 7:45 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story
/12904217/1/safety-worries-make-uber-lyft-fair-game-for-taxi-watchdogs.html
(calling into question the extent of Uber’s background checks by describing an
incident where “the district attorneys for both San Francisco and Los Angeles
issued a statement warning Uber, Lyft and Sidecar that they misled
customers by claiming their background checks of drivers screen out anyone
who has committed driving violations, including DUIs, as well as sexual
assault and other criminal offenses”).
308. Who Are the Drivers on the Uber System?, UBER,
https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/articles/201955457-Who-are-the-drivers-on
-the-Uber-system- (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
309. See id. (noting that “drivers on the Uber system are independent
contractors”).
310. Derek Thompson, Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky on Building a Company
and Starting a “Sharing” Revolution, ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2013, 2:07 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/08/airbnb-ceo-brian-chesky
-on-building-a-company-and-starting-a-sharing-revolution/278635/.
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between hosts and travelers and ensures the payment.311 Yet,
more recently it has been announced that the company will
start collecting local taxes for their hosts.312 The following
section analyzes the reasons for traditional taxi regulation and
questions whether these arguments are equally applicable to
Uber and similar network transportation systems in the
sharing economy.
The mentioned concerns are just some of the aspects that
should be brought to attention regarding these online platforms
that facilitate contact between individuals. In addition, the
quality and reliability of shareable goods and services are
highly dependent on the effectiveness of peer-review
systems.313 Airbnb started its business by sending employees to
New York City to meet hosts in person.314 However, with the
expansion of its business this is far from being possible.315 The
system’s safety and protection against fraud relies heavily on
peer-reviews and the fact that the payment will only be
transferred to the host after the traveler has checked in.316
Travelers may nonetheless see their reservations suddenly
cancelled—something that would rarely happen in the case of a
hotel.317 Travelers may also find houses that do not comply
with safety and fire regulations, or that do not comply with
common standards of hygiene.318
311. How Does the Airbnb Payment System Work?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/51 (last visited Nov 3, 2014).
312. How Do Taxes Work for Guests?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com
/help/article/318 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
313. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 59–81 (Yale Univ. Press
2006).
314. See Thompson, supra note 310 (discussing the 34,000 cities and
jurisdictions to which Airbnb hosts are subject).
315. See id.
316. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
317. How Do I Cancel a Reservation As a Host?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/166 (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
318. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 298; Tom Newcombe, Airbnb Given Safety
Standards Warning, BBT (July 17, 2014), http://buyingbusinesstravel.com
/news/1722814-airbnb-issued-safety-standards-warning (showing that some
residences rented on Airbnb do not meet safety standards).
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C. RULES FOR THE RIDE
Up until now, it has been unclear what the “rules” for
sharing are. As mentioned above, users of sharing practices
prefer sharing to ownership for a number of reasons, including
flexibility in storage (you can return your shared bike or Zipcar
in multiple locations); anti-consumerism, social or
sustainability benefits; and the offer of similar goods or
services for low prices.319 However, should this similarity
between the commercial version of a product or service and the
shared one determine the application of the same rules? Uber,
for example, maintains that it is not a taxi company and it
should not be required to comply by the rules applicable to that
sector.320 Up until recently, Uber has not complied with
traditional rules for commercial services, waiting for the
enactment of specific rules for its innovative services.321
In August 2014, the Maryland Public Service Commission
ruled that Uber Technologies should be subject to the same
regulations imposed on other for-hire vehicle services in the
state since it was “a common carrier.”322 However, the
commission acknowledged that new rules were necessary for
these new forms of transportation and recognized that “many
industry changes and technological advances have occurred
since these regulations were adopted, including the everyday
use of the Internet.”323 The Commission announced that new
rules reflecting the evolution of transportation should be
crafted within ninety days, and should welcome input from
Uber and other interested parties.324 Maryland Public Service
Commission appears to have adopted a hybrid position: on the
one hand, it considers that Uber should be regulated because it
319. See Lamberton & Rose, supra note 11, at 111.
320. Julia Verlaine & Jim Brunsden, Uber Insists ‘Ceci N’Est Pas un Taxi’
in City of Magritte, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2014, 12:09 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-12/uber-insists-ceci-n-est-pas-un-taxi
-in-city-of-magritte.html.
321. See id.; see infra note 322 and accompanying text.
322. MD. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, MARYLAND PSC FINDS THAT UBER IS A
COMMON CARRIER 1 (Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://webapp.psc
.state.md.us/Intranet/sitesearch/Whats_new/Maryland%20PSC%20Finds%20t
hat%20Uber%20is%20a%20Common%20Carrier.pdf.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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is “a common carrier.”325 On the other, it acknowledges that
modern rules might be necessary.326
Before adopting a position on this topic, it is important to
question why taxis are regulated in the first place, and whether
these elements are equally present in the sharing economy and
the technology that accompanies it.327 Taxis are among the
most extensively regulated forms of transportation.328 These
regulations affect the quantity, quality, price, and availability
of taxicabs.329 Price regulation is necessary first because
consumer demand is usually immediate, meaning that a
consumer will not be willing to bargain the price or look for
another service provider.330 This can happen when one uses
Uber or Lyft on exceptionally busy days. For example, taking
an Uber or Lyft on a 4th of July evening after the fireworks on
the Mall might mean that you have to pay twice as much.331
However, thanks to price regulation, hailing a taxi in the same
325. Id. (“The Commission concluded . . . ‘Uber is a common carrier and a
public service company over whom the Commission has jurisdiction.’”).
326. Id. (“The order . . . also directs Commission staff to draft new
regulations that protect the public interest, but also reflect the evolving
nature of transportation services like Uber.”).
327. For example, do certain regulations (such as the knowledge exam
imposed on taxi drivers in London) still make sense with advanced technology
(in a world where any driver can find her way around with GPS devices)? See,
e.g., Roff Smith, For London’s Cabbies, Job Entails World’s Hardest Geography
Test, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 8, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic
.com/news/special-features/2014/08/140808-london-cabbies-knowledge-cabs-ha
nsom-uber-hippocampus-livery/ (discussing the test drivers take in London);
cf. John Tamny, Uber Erases ‘The Knowledge’ in London All the While
Enhancing Driver and Passenger Knowledge, FORBES (July 13, 2014, 9:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2014/07/13/uber-erases-the-know
ledge-in-london-all-the-while-enhancing-driver-and-passenger-knowledge/
(discussing how Uber is supplanting taxi drivers’ expertise in London).
328. Bruce Schaller, Entry Controls in Taxi Regulation: Implications of US
and Canadian Experience for Taxi Regulation and Deregulation, 14 TRANSP.
POL’Y 490, 490 (2007).
329. Id. However, the heavy regulation of the taxi market has also been
mentioned as an example of inefficient governmental regulation. See Robert D.
Cairns & Catherine Liston-Heyes, Competition and Regulation in the Taxi
Industry, 59 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1 (1996).
330. Edward C. Gallick & David E. Sisk, A Reconsideration of Taxi
Regulation, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 117, 118 (1987).
331. Connor Simpson, Uber Busted for Intentionally Surging Prices, WIRE
(Feb. 26, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://www.thewire.com/technology/2014/02/uber
-busted-intentionally-surging-prices/358555/ (showing that Uber’s prices
fluctuate drastically based on demand).
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evening should cost you as much as any other evening.332
Second, there is a clear case of information asymmetry between
the professional taxi driver who knows how to get around the
city (and can extend the passenger’s journey far beyond what
was desired).333 In the case of Uber, the rider is dealing with a
driver that very often does not know the area very well and will
use the Uber app to find her way or simply follow the rider’s
instructions.334 Third, in cities like London, taxi drivers have to
take a knowledge exam to prove a basic knowledge of the city.
Fourth, a license is required for taxis to guarantee that drivers
do not have a criminal record, abuse drugs, or have health
conditions that can affect their driving skills.335 After all, you
typically get in a car with a stranger you will never see again.
However, how far should these taxi regulations go in the
context of the sharing economy? If Uber is not a taxi but an
innovative sharing service, should its drivers be subject to the
same requirements? It may not make sense to impose on
individuals who “play taxi drivers” on Friday evenings the
same requirements imposed on professional taxi drivers. Riders
have different expectations, and the information asymmetries
and the market failures are reduced in the case of network
transportation systems like Uber or Lyft.336 The tracking and
peer-review systems provided by Uber offer an additional
protection—even if it is just a psychological one—to most
332. Gallick & Sisk, supra note 330, at 118 (discussing the benefits of
uniform pricing).
333. Lydia Emmanouili, Drivers, Passengers Say Uber App Doesn’t Always
Yield Best Routes, NPR (Sept. 21, 2014, 5:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09
/18/349560787/drivers-passengers-say-uber-app-doesnt-always-yield-best-rou
tes (highlighting the discrepancy in knowledge between taxi drivers and Uber
drivers).
334. Id.
335. E.g., How to Become a Taxi Driver, SFTMA, http://www.sfmta.com
/services/taxi-industry/become-taxi-driver (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) (showing
the many steps and qualifications required to become a taxi driver in San
Francisco); Tamny, supra note 327.
336. See generally The Driver, My Uber Passengers Hates Uber Navigation,
RIDESHARE DASHBOARD (Oct. 6, 2014), http://ridesharedashboard.com/2014
/10/06/uber-passengers-hates-uber-navigation/ (discussing that passengers
usually have a way they prefer the driver to take). See, e.g., Tamny, supra
note 327.
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riders.337 While taxi regulations were conceived to compensate
for specific market failures in the context of the commercial
relationship between a professional taxi-driver and a consumer,
the fact that Uber brings a non-professional taxi-driver and a
consumer together for a ride should not exempt the company
from regulation.338 The risks to safety of the rider are not
nonexistent.339 However, old rules designed for the taxi
industry do not fit Uber and its peers. Instead, modern
regulations are required.340
We come to the point where we start understanding that
we need regulations that allow sharing and caring.341 Can you
share and innovate by the book? You can, but first someone has
to write the book. In October 2014, the District of Columbia
Council enacted a bill entitled “Vehicle for the Innovation
Amendment Act of 2014,” designed to regulate Lyft, Uber,
Sidecar, and UberX-type services in the District.342 Under this
bill, Uber drivers should, among other requirements, be at least
twenty-one-years-old, have no criminal record, have adequate
insurance, and have their vehicles inspected on a yearly basis.
This D.C. Bill might be the first page of this book.
337. Jeff Bercovici, Uber’s Ratings Terrorize Drivers And Trick Riders. Why
Not Fix Them?, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-are-we-actually-rating-when-we-rate-other
-people/.
338. See Emily Badger, Why We Can’t Figure Out How To Regulate Airbnb,
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/23/why-we-cant-figure-out-how-to-regulate-airbnb/
(arguing that despite the status of Uber and Lyft drivers as “quasi-
professionals” rather than “strictly commercial enterprises in the traditional
sense of a hotel or a taxi or a company,” regulation is required at some level to
protect public safety); see also Shapiro, supra note 271.
339. See supra Part IV.B (discussing risks of the sharing economy as a
whole, and in particular, for Uber and Lyft passengers).
340. See id. (discussing that modern regulation needs to evolve with the
sharing economy); Henn, supra note 1 (suggesting that governments will need
to adapt to these new sharing economy practices, which do not fit traditional
regulatory frameworks); see also infra Part V.A (discussing difficulties and
inconsistencies that result from applying traditional regulation to newer
sharing economy practices like Uber or Lyft).
341. Cf. Part IV.B.
342. Lori Aratani, D.C. Council Okays Bill to Legalize Lyft, Sidecar, UberX-
type Services in the District, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/10/28/d-c-council-ok
ays-bill-to-legalize-lyft-sidecar-uberx-type-services-in-the-district/.
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V. SHARING BY THE BOOK
The sharing economy offers a number of advantages: lower
prices,343 stronger communities,344 a greater number of players
in the market,345 and greater access to services that were once
regarded as a luxury.346 Notwithstanding these advantages, the
sharing economy is opening the door to a number of problems
as well.347 Protests regarding the unfair competition and lack of
licenses of service providers, scams on numerous websites, and
risks to public health and safety may lurk around the corner.348
We book a hotel because we trust that it will have all the
required licenses and inspections, and will provide a pleasant
place to spend the night.349 Our expectations might be lower in
the case of the sharing economy, but they are not
nonexistent.350 The sharing economy is based on the bona fides
of all participants.351 We trust that all participants will abide
by the rules of the game and we use peer-review as a control
343. See e.g., Michael Cabanatuan, Ride Services Decimate S.F. Taxi
Industry’s Business, SFGATE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bay
area/article/Taxi-use-plummets-in-San-Francisco-65-percent-in-5760251.php
(highlighting how successful startups have been in competing with taxi
services); see supra note 280 and accompanying text.
344. See Belk, supra note 2, at 1599 (“Sharing makes a great deal of
practical and economic sense for the consumer, the environment, and the
community.”).
345. See generally id. (discussing how increased access to resources that
has accompanied the rise of the sharing economy may require redefining
“ownership”).
346. See id. at 1598 (“Internet facilitate[s] [the] ability to help people find
things we once had to buy or rent or lease.”); see supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
347. E.g., Brownsword & Yeung, supra note 37 (providing an overview of
how new technology causes general regulatory challenges); supra Part IV.B
(discussing safety risks inherent in sharing economy practices).
348. E.g., Tran, supra note 15 (discussing taxi drivers striking in London,
Paris, Madrid, and Berlin); see also text accompanying notes 298–23.
349. E.g., Newcombe, supra note 318 (discussing expectations of travelers
and how Airbnb may fail to deliver); see also ERIC. T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y.
ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 29 (outlining the multitude of regulations
imposed on hotels to protect expectations of travelers).
350. Cf. Bercovici, supra note 337 (discussing general expectations of Uber
users).
351. E.g., Belk, supra note 2, at 1598 (highlighting the importance of trust
in the business model of the sharing economy).
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mechanism.352 However, peer-review of other users might come
too late in certain cases.353 Law is being called in as a “weapon”
to avoid social conflict and as a shield against the uncertainty
implied in innovative forms of sharing economy practices.354
A number of sharing practices do not require any
regulation; they belong to our personal sphere. This is the case
for transactions that happen on a small-scale, involve greater
accountability, are motivated by a spirit of giving and taking,
engage people working together as equals, and involve
significant transparency.355 The sharing economy practices
analyzed in this Article are situated in the gray area between
these socially oriented activities and commercial activities.356
Until now, the sharing economy has remained to a great
extent unregulated.357 While a laissez-faire approach might not
be enough to gain the trust of risk-averse consumers, one may
also inquire how far stringent regulation of the sharing
economy should go. On the one hand, innovators—here,
talented housewives, handymen, individuals playing taxi driver
or master chefs—must have the freedom to create their own
social enterprises or allow entrepreneurs behind smartphone
applications to develop electronic platforms to bring them
together. However, as Robert Cooter argues, “freedom requires
law, not its absence,”358 so the freedom to concretize innovative
ideas implies effective law, complete contracts, and specialized
352. Id. (“San Francisco ride sharers and many other such services help to
build trust in particular people, and distrust of others, through online ratings
after the fact.”); Ferenstein, supra note 266 (explaining how peer-review arises
out of the need for trust in the sharing economy: “[t]his requires a whole lot of
trust and thus information about each person”).
353. See Belk, supra note 2, at 1598 (explaining that online ratings occur
after the fact); Huet, supra note 276 and accompanying text; see also Manjoo,
supra note 276.
354. Austin T. Turk, Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict, in THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF LAW 43, 43–47 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
355. See ORSI, supra note 47.
356. Badger, supra note 338 (“Airbnb hosts, Lyft drivers and even Etsy
entrepreneurs all by definition blend the personal and the commercial.”).
357. Cf. MD. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 322 (noting generally how
innovative sharing economy practices do not fit squarely within existing
regulations); Shapiro, supra note 271 (citing challenges of regulation as the
cause of the lack of regulation).
358. Cooter, supra note 186, at 39.
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rules to fill gaps in business contracts.359 Although Cooter’s
argument is focused on the regulation of innovation in
developing countries, his reasoning could also be tested against
the background of the sharing economy. Cooter argues that
“the [real] enemy of economy liberty is monopoly, which only
permits a few to seek wealth . . . with restrictive laws, state
officials can . . . choose who is allowed to do business. To
sustain monopoly, public officials crowd out private law with
public law.”360
Law may sometimes show little understanding of the rules
of entrepreneurship and this is far from a new topic. Almost
one century ago, Roscoe Pound regretted that:
[L]aw is not determined by the needs of business nor does it draw its
ideas of partnership from the universal understanding and practice
of business men. It was fixed centuries ago when Roman jurists
sought to understand partnership in terms of consortium of co-heirs
after the death of the head of a household.361
While the idea of co-heirs of businesses and the need to
maintain certain monopolies have had better days, it is
important to question how we can (or should) legalize the
freedom to share without transgressing the borders of current
legal frameworks.
First, we should ask why regulations are imposed in
certain fields; for example, why do we need a license to be a
taxi driver or regulations to start a hotel? While these strict
regulations might protect a professional group and keep fares
high, these regulations also aim to protect our safety, public
health, and urban planning.362 Car rental companies have
specific insurance requirements and are subject to
inspections.363 Hotels are subject to health and safety laws,
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGALHISTORY 112 (1923).
362. Schaller, supra note 328, at 491 (discussing the safety rationale for
entry regulation, particularly in the taxi industry, even in response to
economic arguments against it). See generally supra Part IV.B (discussing the
need for regulation in the conventional commercial sphere to protect
consumers from physical and economic harm).
363. See Ron Lieber, Share a Car, Risk Your Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/your-money/auto-insurance
/enthusiastic-about-car-sharing-your-insurer-isnt.html (explaining how the
practice of renting out a personal car may not meet regulatory requirements of
rental car companies to carry proper insurance).
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zoning restrictions, special taxes, and rules governing public
accommodation and advertising rates.364 In the sharing
economy, the lack of clear and specific rules for some practices
might open the door to multiple legal problems. I can rent my
living room to anyone and no one will check whether my house
complies with safety standards.365 Perhaps my guests do not
expect it either, because my house is not a hotel, at least until a
fire breaks out and they have troubles finding the emergency
exit.
The description of the potential risks regarding sharing
economy practices brings us to an interesting question: if this
area has been left unregulated, can we try to extend existing
legal concepts to sharing economy practices? Can we use
current legal frameworks to regulate the sharing economy, or
do we need new rules?
A. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
In times of sharing and innovation through collaboration,
we are required to ask whether we should convert
interpretation of laws into a “creative activity.” After all,
legislators were not likely thinking about the private room
rentals of Airbnb when they drafted regulations on hotels and
inns.366 However, considering the text of some state or local
laws, judges might not need to be very creative in order to
consider a sharing economy business hosting guests as an
unlicensed hotel.367 For example in Virginia, a hotel is “any
place offering to the public for compensation transitory lodging
364. ORSI, supra note 47, at 420.
365. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 7 (highlighting the
minimal requirements of renting out rooms on Airbnb, as “technology has
reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets cheaper and easier than
ever . . . ”); see ERIC. T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 29,
at 4 (noting the ease with which “users of web platforms like Airbnb who run
large-scale enterprises” might “violat[e] of fire safety, zoning, tax, and other
applicable laws”); Ferenstein, supra note 266 (providing the views of the
Airbnb CEO that a “micro-entrepreneur shouldn’t need a fire marshal and
inspections if they want to rent out their home for a weekend”).
366. See generally Badger, supra note 338 (arguing that sharing economy
practices of Airbnb and Uber tend to occupy a middle ground that does not fit
traditional regulatory schemes).
367. E.g., Donna Tam, NY Official: Airbnb Stay Illegal; Host Fined $2,400,
CNET (May 20, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/ny-official-airbnb
-stay-illegal-host-fined-2400/.
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or sleeping accommodations, overnight or otherwise, including
but not limited to facilities known by varying nomenclatures or
designations as hotels, motels, travel lodges, tourist homes, or
hostels.”368 In other states, and despite the objections of the
owners of online platforms, not much creativity is required
either.369 In May 2013, Judge Clive Morrick, in New York,
decided that a host was indeed operating an unlicensed hotel
and was sentenced to a fine of $2400.370 He was hosting
strangers for three days for compensation.371
The application of current legal frameworks to the sharing
economy has also opened the doors to stringent approaches on
the other side of the Atlantic.372 In April, a Belgian court
declared Uber’s activities illegal and warned that a $13,800
fine would be applied every time an Uber car tried to pick up a
client.373 Neelie Kroes, vice-president of the European
Commission at the time, expressed her outrage toward this
decision, arguing that this “decision was not about helping or
protecting passengers, [but] it was about protecting the taxi
cartel.”374 Forms of the sharing economy are facing legal
objections in many different parts of the globe,375 challenging
entrenched groups and forcing prices down.376 However, the
lack of adequate regulation appears to be harming innovation
since judges are extending the existing legal frameworks to
sharing economy practices.377 As mentioned earlier, regulations
of hotels and restaurants were conceived for relationships
368. VA. CODE ANN. §35.1 (2010).
369. Tam, supra note 367.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. E.g., Steve Dent, Belgium Bans Uber, Threatens €10,000 Fine for Each
Attempted Pickup, ENGADGET (April 15, 2014, 5:49 AM),
http://www.engadget.com/2014/04/15/belgian-uber-ban-10k-fines/; Newcombe,
supra note 318 (reporting the UK’s concern over Airbnb hosts violating safety
regulations, and steps taken to ensure compliance).
373. Dent, supra note 372.
374. Neelie Kroes, Crazy Court Decision to Ban Uber in Brussels, EUR.
COMMISSION (Apr. 15, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/kroes
/en/content/crazy-court-decision-ban-uber-brussels-show-your-anger.
375. E.g., Dent, supra note 372; Tam, supra note 367.
376. See Belk, supra note 2, at 1599.
377. See Dent, supra note 372 (applying existing statutory regulations to
Airbnb); Newcombe, supra note 318.
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between professionals and consumers, and not for individual-
to-individual transactions.378
While we do not want excessive and outdated regulations
that stifle innovation, not regulating the sharing economy
seems to be opening the door to the application of existing
stringent regulations.379 This may lead to a total
discouragement of innovation in this sector. In any case, we do
not need to call in the regulatory heavy artillery.
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has
recently legalized ride-sharing practices, requiring, among
others, that Uber, Lyft, and other transportation network
drivers have a license to operate and inspect the vehicles,
require drivers to undergo a criminal background check, and
carry one million dollar liability insurance.380 This Commission
imposed twenty-eight rules on transportation network drivers,
but considered that, if regulated, these sharing economy
practices did not endanger public safety.381 Although the
number of rules might sound excessive, CPUC President
Michael R. Peevey declared that these rules would allow
“Transportation Network Companies to compete with more
traditional forms of transportation and for both drivers and
consumers to have greater choice within the transportation
industry.”382 In Colorado, ride-sharing has also been authorized
as of June 2014.383 By enacting a specific law on ride-sharing
practices, Colorado aims to combine the desire to encourage
innovation with the need to guarantee public safety.384 This
378. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 338, 356.
379. See supra notes 369–78 and accompanying text (discussing cases
where courts applied existing legal frameworks to Airbnb and Uber, leading to
overly heavy penalties).
380. See Press Release, California Public Utilities Commission, CPUC
Establishes Rules for Transportation Network Companies (Sept. 19, 2013),
available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K132
/77132276.PDF.
381. Id. (outlining steps proposed to ensure that these innovative
transportation services do not compromise public safety).
382. Id.
383. See S. 14-12, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Co. 2014), available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics/CLICS2014A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/70364091166B
28FC87257C4300636F6B?Open&file=125_enr.pdf.
384. Andy Vuong, Colorado First to Authorize Lyft and Uber’s Ridesharing
Services, DENVER POST (June 4, 2014, 6:32 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_25907057/colorado-first-authorize-lyft
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law requires Uber and Lyft and other ride-sharing companies
to carry primary commercial insurance during the whole
activity.385 Specific rules seem to be a preferred solution.386
However, can these rules keep up with the fast changing
nature of the sharing economy?
B. NEW RULES
A more innovation-friendly approach to the sharing
economy could imply establishing broader, principle-based
regulation specific to the sharing economy.387 Such rules would
not be bound by the limitations of existing technology, but
would rather be open to potentially new sharing economy
practices in different fields.388 There are different aspects that
seem to be common to most of these practices and should be
considered in the specific regulation of the sharing economy.389
In the particular case of shared rides and accommodation, we
can think about criminal background checks, personal
inspection of premises or take-in interviews with service-
providers, adequate insurance, and the collection of taxes.390 In
-and-ubers-ridesharing-services (“Colorado is . . . promoting innovation and
competition while protecting consumers and public safety.”).
385. Id. (“Lyft, Uber and other ride-sharing companies will have
to . . . carry at least $1 million in liability insurance. The companies, or their
drivers, will also have to carry primary insurance coverage during the
controversial gap period—when a driver is soliciting fares but hasn’t been
matched with a rider.”).
386. See supra notes 380–84 and accompanying text (discussing sharing
economy-specific laws enacted in California and Colorado).
387. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 271 (advocating for broad regulation of
parent companies over individual providers, particularly in light of similar
safety concerns across sharing economy practices).
388. See, e.g., MD. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 322 (highlighting the
need for special rules to apply to the emerging sharing economy).
389. See Shapiro, supra note 271 (describing how it would be “more
effective and efficient to regulate parent companies” as an overarching policy
rather than individual providers, due in part to common concerns about
safety, liability, and insurance that permeate the sharing economy in the
network transportation field); see also Badger, supra note 338 (arguing for
rules specific to the sharing economy by suggesting “setting limits on [sharing
economy practices] that explicitly acknowledge their quasi-professional
status”) (emphasis added).
390. Cf. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 7 (citing common
regulatory concerns that arise from sharing economy practices, including
insurance, liability, violation of industry-specific regulation, and tax
collection).
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addition, it is important to make sure that there is no
uncertainty as to liability should accidents occur.391 Online
platforms are often in a better position to protect the customer
than the small entrepreneurs providing these sharing economy
services.392 Moreover, in order to respond to the uncertain
nature of innovation in the sharing economy,393 regulations
could be first enacted on a temporary and/or even experimental
basis and later be evaluated and adapted.
As mentioned above, although sharing practices are far
from recent phenomena, the shared access to a number of
facilities and services has been facilitated by new
technologies.394 These examples of the sharing economy allow a
greater number of people to have access to certain services for a
reduced price.395 The sharing economy is “democratizing” the
access to innovation and innovation in technologies is creating
a wider scope of opportunities of sharing. However, our
democratic and administrative systems are not always
sufficiently responsive to these new challenges and to the fast
tempo that characterizes their emergence.396 Nonetheless, as
John McGinnnis explains, “democracy serves many functions.
It helps create the preferences of citizens, making the
391. Id. (“As they become more numerous and more popular, however,
sharing services have started to run up against snags. There are questions
around insurance and legal liability.”); cf. Nairi, Eliminating Ridesharing
Insurance Ambiguity, UBER (Mar. 14, 2014), http://blog.uber.com/uber
Xridesharinginsurance (detailing Uber’s attempt to address ambiguity in
insurance coverage and liability for accidents that occur when Uber drivers
get into accidents).
392. See Shapiro, supra note 271 (arguing that, unlike individual service
providers, “the companies have the resources and incentives to ensure
compliance with safety and insurance requirements.”).
393. See supra Parts I.B, II.A (discussing the complex nature of
innovation); see also All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 7 (noting
the “growing pains” felt by the sharing economy as a whole in the face of
uncertain growth and accompanying regulation).
394. E.g., Belk, supra note 2, at 1596 (“The Internet . . . has brought about
many new ways of sharing as well as facilitating older forms of sharing on a
larger scale.”); see supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3 (discussing how the online and
technological platform of the emerging sharing economy is key to its
innovative character).
395. See generally Belk, supra note 2.
396. E.g., MD. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 322 (applying existing
regulatory structures to ridesharing, but suggesting new rules that would
provide a better fit).
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government responsive to what the public want.”397 If the
public seems to want to share rides, the government should be
responsive to these preferences while remaining cautious about
potential risks.
VI. CONCLUSION
The basic idea of the sharing economy is to own less and
have access to more.398 “[S]how hospitality to strangers, for by
doing so some people have shown hospitality to angels without
knowing it.”399 A noble idea, but sharing does not always mean
caring, particularly if it is done for compensation and with total
strangers.400 The innovative character of these sharing
practices poses a number of challenges to regulators, namely,
should they be submitted to the requirements of equivalent
commercial practices?401 When should they be considered
economically and legally irrelevant? How can regulators find
the balance between the advancement of innovation and the
need to safeguard public safety and health, and protect
customers from problems with liability and fraud? Until now,
regulators have largely refused to acknowledge the
phenomenon of the sharing economy and have applied instead
the legal tools for the equivalent commercial practices. This has
resulted in the prohibition of certain sharing economy
practices, such as Uber and Lyft, in many cities.402 Simply put,
the formula has been: Different Game + Same Rules = Game
Over.
This Article puts the phenomenon of the sharing economy
in the legal spotlight. Most practices in the sharing economy
397. JOHN MCGINNIS, ACCELERATING DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMING
GOVERNANCE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY (2013).
398. Belk, supra note 2, at 1595 (discussing the shift in the definition of
“ownership” that will need to accompany our trend to own less but access
more); Botsman, supra note 277, at 97.
399. A common phrase, often attributed to Hebrews 13:2.
400. See Belk, supra note 2 at 1596 (distinguishing between true sharing
and self-motivation); see supra Part IV.B (discussing risks inherent to the
sharing economy).
401. See Shapiro, supra note 271; see supra Part V.A.
402. See supra Part V.A (discussing the heavy fines and consequences that
result from applying current laws to ridesharing and home rental).
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are innovative therefore difficult to regulate.403 In addition,
they often oscillate between the border of personal and
commercial activities. In the context of specific rules designed
to respond to these new realities, innovation law, this Article
calls for limited, but specific, regulation of the sharing
economy. Regulators should start thinking about specific rules
that should be imposed on sharing economy practices; practices
that are regarded as substitutes to similar commercial goods
and services. Regulation at this level should refer to
compulsory contracts between parties, compensation, minimum
skill requirements, and rules on liability. Relying on the
goodness and hospitality of strangers should always be our
starting point, but knowing that rules can be enforced when
these values are not there can be the key element to avoid
disappointment.
The sharing economy needs a new legal framework.
Current legal frameworks do not suffice. Innovators in this
area want to steer away from traditional perceptions,
ownership-related concepts, and business to consumer
relationships, and instead move in the direction of innovation.
Before you share the ride—and perhaps one day a flight—with
these innovators, we must make sure these innovators obtain
their “light-weighted licenses” for your own safety. Only then
might sharing rhyme once again with caring.
403. See supra Part III.B (discussing challenges related to regulating
innovation).
